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On October 25, 1983, units of the U.S. Rangers parachuted
onto an airstrip under construction at Point Salines, Grenada.
They soon became involved in hostilities with a group of Cuban
workers who were building the airstrip. The hostilities resulted in
the deaths of twenty-four Cubans1 and approximately five Rang-
ers.2 While the question of the U.S. intervention in Grenada itself
has been the subject of scholarly scrutiny,3 the United States-Cu-
ban "sideshow" has not. Yet the hostilities between the U.S. Rang-
ers and the Cuban workers raise disputed issues of fact and novel
issues of law on the use of force by states and on the status of
internees.
1. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE AND U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, GRENADA: A PRELIMINARY REPORT 1
(1983) [hereinafter cited as A PRELIMINARY REPORT]. EDrrORIAL DE CIENCIAS SOCIALES, LA
HABANA, GRENADA: THE WORLD AGAINST THE CRIME 230-233 (1983) [hereinafter cited as EDI-
TORIAL DE CIENCIAS]. The latter source, a compilation of Cuban Government documents
about the Grenada invasion, provides photos and biographies of the 24 Cubans, describing
22 as civilians involved in construction of the Point Salines airport and two as officers in the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba. The Department of State and the Department of
Defense give the number of Cubans wounded as 59. A PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra at 1. The
collection of Cuban Government documents gives the number as 57. EDITORIAL DE CIENCIAS,
supra at 295.
2. A PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 1, at 1. The Departments of State and of Defense
reported that 18 U.S. personnel were killed in action and 116 wounded. Id. Two more died
later. Columbus Citizen-Journal, Oct. 22, 1984, at 16, col. 3. Of the 20, apparently only five
Rangers were killed at Point Salines, and these could have been killed by Grenadian troops.
Wash. Post, Nov. 9, 1983, at A34, col. 3.
3. See, e.g., Nanda, The United States Armed Intervention in Grenada-Impact on
World Order, 14 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 395 (1984); Gordon, Bilder, Rovine & Wallace, Interna-
tional Law and the United States Action in Grenada: A Report, 18 INT'L LAW. 331 (1984);
J.N. MOORE, LAW AND THE GRENADA MISSION (1984); W. GILMORE, THE GRENADA INTERVEN-
TION: ANALYSIS AND DOCUMENTATION (1984); Joyner, The United States Action in Grenada:
Reflections on the Lawfulness of Invasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 131 (1984); Moore, Grenada
and the International Double Standard, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 145 (1984); Vagts, International
Lawunder Time Pressure: Grading the Grenada Take-Home Examination, 78 AM. J. INT'L
L. 169 (1984); Boyle, Chayes, Dore, Falk, Feinrider, Ferguson, Fine, Nunes & Weston, Inter-
national Lawlessness in Grenada, 78 Am. J. INT'L L. 172 (1984); Karas & Goodman, The
United States Action in Grenada: An Exercise in Realpolitik, 16 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L.
REV. 53 (1984).
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Analysis of both the use of force issue and the status of intern-
ees issue is rendered difficult by the fact that the United States
and Cuba differ markedly in their versions of the events, into
which no impartial body has inquired. This Article will examine
available information on the events and draw tentative conclusions
as to what actually occurred. This Article will also address both
issues on the use of force and the status of internees based on the
facts given by each state.
The use of force issue concerns, in the first instance, who at-
tacked whom, and who is consequently responsible. The hostilities
occurred between a unit of U.S. Army Rangers and Airborne
troops, and a group of Cuban construction workers after the Rang-
ers parachuted onto an airstrip. The Cuban Government claims
that the Rangers attacked the non-combatant workers. The U.S.
Government claims the Cuban workers, acting as part of the de-
fense of Grenada, opened fire on the Rangers. If the Cuban version
is correct (that the Cubans were attacked by the Rangers), then
the United States is probably responsible to Cuba. If the U.S. ver-
sion is correct (that the Cubans, acting as part of the defense of
Grenada, attacked the Rangers), then the question of whether
Cuba is responsible to the United States turns on whether the U.S.
attack on Grenada was lawful.
The internee question raises two issues. The first is whether a
non-national civilian force that resists an invading army (the U.S.
version of the events) should, after capture, be considered (a) pris-
oners of war entitled to repatriation, or (b) common criminals sub-ject to execution after court-martial. This issue turns on whether
non-national civilians are "inhabitants," which would qualify them
as prisoners of war under the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva III).' The second issue
is whether a non-national civilian force that does not resist an in-
vading army, but is prepared to resist if attacked, and does so re-
sist (the Cuban version of the events) should, after capture, be
considered under the Geneva Convention as (a) prisoners of war,
or (b) civilian internees.
Both of these internee issues raise questions apparently not
considered by the states who were parties to the Geneva Conven-
tion or to the predecessor conventions which promulgated the defi-
4. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter cited as Geneva III].
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nition of prisoner of war. Though the parties probably did not in-
tend to include these two classes of civilians as prisoners of war, it
seems harsh to exclude them, because that means that they are
subject to being executed after capture by an invading army. If
Geneva III is not read to include such civilians, it is possible that a
customary norm has developed to prohibit an invading army from
executing them. Thus, there may be a need to revise the Geneva
III definition of prisoner of war to include such civilians.
Since the facts are critical to the analysis of both the use of
force issue and the status of internees issue, this Article will first
analyze the facts as portrayed by Cuba and the United States.
II. POSITIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CUBAN GOVERNMENTS
ON THE HOSTILITIES
U.S. Army Ranger units landed at Point Salines airstrip
(southwest Grenada) by parachute at approximately 5:30 a.m. on
October 25, 1983. Units of the U.S. Marine Corps had landed at
Pearls Airport (eastern Grenada) approximately a half an hour
earlier. These were the first units of what eventually became a U.S.
invasion force of 6000 troops.
Upon landing, the Rangers engaged in combat with both the
People's Liberation Army of Grenada (P.L.A.), and Cuban workers
who were near their dormitories. The P.L.A. employed Grenadian
anti-aircraft guns against the Rangers.
The United States and Cuban Governments disagree as to
how the hostilities commenced between the Rangers and the work-
ers. The Cuban Government has consistently maintained that the
workers were not part of the defense of Grenada. While Cuba had
anticipated a U.S. invasion, it had not planned to have its workers
resist the entry of U.S. forces. However, the Cuban Government
acknowledges that the workers were prepared to defend themselves
if attacked, and that some had light weapons and had had previous
military training. The workers were being prepared for such self-
defense by a small number of Cuban military officers. Some of the
workers had assumed defensive positions near their dormitories
upon learning of the 5:00 a.m. Marine landing at Pearls Airport.
The Cuban Government maintains that at approximately 7:00
a.m. the Rangers fired at some of the workers, and that the work-
ers fired back in self-defense. Cuba further maintains that the
workers were prepared at all times to cease hostilities provided
[Vol. 17:2202
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they were not made to surrender to the U.S. forces.
The U.S. Government's version is less clear. Unlike the Cuban
Government, the U.S. Government did not, during the events in
question, issue press communiques describing the events or a for-
mal statement regarding the commencement of combat with the
Cubans. In fact, while various U.S. spokespersons asserted that the
workers formed part of the defense of Grenada and had initiated
combat with the Rangers, the U.S. Government sent the Cuban
Government, during the fighting, a message indicating U.S. "re-
gret" over the combat.
An analysis of the contacts between the Cuban and U.S. Gov-
ernments immediately prior to and during the events of October
25, 1983, will help to explain the aims and action of the two
parties.
III. UNITED STATES-CUBAN CONTACTS PRECEDING THE U.S.
INVASION
On Saturday, October 22, 1983, the Cuban Government sent a
message to the U.S. Government indicating its awareness of the
movement of U.S. ships towards Grenada and calling for collabora-
tion in ensuring the safety of their respective civilian groups on
Grenada in the event of U.S. military intervention. This message,
delivered to the U.S. Interests Section in Havana at 9:00 p.m., read
as follows:
That the U.S. side is aware of the developments in Grenada;
that it is also aware of our position on these developments and
of our determination of not interfering in the internal affairs of
that country. That we are aware of their concern about the nu-
merous U.S. residents there. That we are also concerned about
the hundreds of Cuban cooperation personnel working there in
different fields and about the news that U.S. naval forces are
approaching Grenada.
That, according to the reports we have, no U.S. or foreign
national or our personnel has had any problems. It is convenient
to keep in touch on this matter, so as to contribute to solve fa-
vorably any difficulty that may arise or action that may be taken
relating to the security of these individuals, without violence or
intervention in the country.5
5. EDTOiMAL DE CIENCIAS, supra note 1, at 35-36. John Ferch, Chief of the U.S. Inter-
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John Ferch, head of the U.S. Interests Section, characterized
the message as "bizarre" and not requiring a response. According
to Mr. Ferch, the message that was eventually sent by the United
States to Cuba shortly after the invasion commenced on October
25, was not a response to Cuba's October 22 message.8
The United States may have been aware of the instructions
sent to the Cuban workers in Grenada by Cuban President Fidel
Castro. The message, sent on October 22, stated in part:
I believe that, in the face of this new situation, we must
strengthen our defenses, keeping in mind the possibility of a
surprise attack by the Yankees. The existing danger fully justi-
fies our doing so. If the United States intervenes, we must vigor-
ously defend ourselves as if we were in Cuba, in our camp sites
and our work places close by, but only if we are directly at-
tacked. I repeat: only if we are directly attacked. We would thus
be defending ourselves, not the Government or its deeds. If the
Yankees land on the runway section near the university or on its
surroundings to evacuate their citizens, fully refrain from
ests Section in Havana, confirmed that this and other notes exchanged between the United
States and Cuba during the Grenadian events were accurate as published by the Cuban
Government. The U.S. Government has not made any of these notes public. Interview with
John Ferch, Chief of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, Cuba, in Havana (May 10, 1984).
The Washington Post noted the reading of these messages by Cuban President Fidel Castro
at a press conference in Havana. The Washington Post reported that the notes "make care-
fully explicit each side's intention to do everything possible to avoid a confrontation." The
Post reported that the exchange of messages was confirmed by "a U.S. source," presumably
an official of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana. Wash. Post, Oct. 27, 1983, at A10, col. 2.
For a report on the Cuban message of October 22, see Toronto Globe and Mail, Nov. 2,
1983, at 14, col. 6.
6. Interview with John Ferch, Chief of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, Cuba, in
Havana (May 10, 1984). Ferch did not explain why he considered the Cuban message "bi-
zarre." Ferch also indicated that the undersea communications cable usually used by the
U.S. Interests Section to communicate with the State Department did not function from
Sunday, October 23, until Wednesday, October 26. Another Interests Section source gave
the period of malfunction as "Sunday evening until late Tuesday night." Wash. Post, Oct.
27, 1983, at A10, col. 2. Ferch indicated that a telephone hook-up from the Interests Section
to the cable did not function during that period and that this lack of the normal communi-
cations channel impeded communications between the Interests Section and the State De-
partment. He said that the message he delivered to the Cuban Government at 8:30 a.m. on
October 25 would have been delivered several hours earlier had the cable been operational.
He said, however, that in no event would the United States have sent any message to the
Cuban Government prior to the landing of U.S. troops in Grenada. Ferch said that while the
telephone malfunction could have occurred without the Cuban Government's interference,
the telephone remained unrepaired for three days, despite his repeated requests for repair.
He was certain that the Cuban Government intentionally failed to repair the telephone. He
indicated that the lack of use of the cable forced him to use the ordinary telephone, which
he said the Cuban Government could monitor. Interview with John Ferch, Chief of the U. S.
Interests Section in Havana, Cuba, in Havana (May 10, 1984).
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interfering. 7
The message further stated that Cuba had turned down a request
made by General Hudson Austin, Chairman of the Revolutionary
Military Council of Grenada,8 that the Cuban workers take part in
the defense of Grenada against a possible U.S. intervention.
Convey to Austin and Layne' the following oral reply to
their proposals: That our force, essentially made up of civilian
cooperation workers, is too small to be considered as a signifi-
cant military factor vis-a-vis a large-scale U.S. invasion. That
sending reinforcements is impossible and unthinkable. That the
political situation created inside the country due to the people's
estrangement on account of the death of Bishop and other lead-
ers, isolation from the outside world, etc. considerably weakens
the country's defense capabilities, a logical consequence derived
from the serious errors made by Grenadian revolutionaries.
That, due to the above situation, the present military and politi-
cal conditions are the worst for organizing a firm and efficient
resistance against the invaders, an action which is practically
impossible without the people's participation. That they have to
find a way to reach a reconciliation with the people; perhaps one
way would be to clarify the death of Bishop and the other lead-
ers and seek out those responsible.' 0
While it is not known whether U.S. intelligence was aware of
this message, it apparently was aware of the Cuban construction
workers, and of the fact that they could not effectively resist a U.S.
attack." This is indicated by the message sent by the State De-
partment to Cuba at 5:00 p.m. October 25, stating: "The United
States is aware that armed Cuban personnel do not have either the
7. EDITORIAL DE CIENCIAS, supra note 1, at 34. Wash. Post, Oct. 27, 1983, at A10, col. 4
(press conference with Fidel Castro).
8. The Revolutionary Military Council was established by ranking members of the New
Jewel Movement on October 19, 1983, following the assassination that day of Prime Minis-
ter Maurice Bishop. H. O'SHAUGHNESSY, GRENADA: REVOLUTION, INVASION AND AFTERMATH
140 (1984).
9. Lt. Col. Ewart Layne, one of two vice-chairmen of the Revolutionary Military Coun-
cil. Id. The person ordered to convey the message orally was Julian Torres Rizo, Cuban
Ambassador to Grenada. H. O'SHAUGHNESSY, GRENADA: AN EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE U.S.
INVASION AND THE CARIBBEAN HISTORY THAT PROVOKED IT 151 (1984).
10. EDITORIAL DE CIENCIAS, supra note 1, at 34-35. Castro read this note at a press
conference in Havana on October 26, 1983. Wash. Post, Oct. 27, 1983, at A10, col. 4. On the
poor relations between the Revolutionary Military Council and Cuba, see H.
O'SHAUGHNESSY, supra note 8, at 148-50.
11. Berry, Ten Days of Urgent Fury, ALL HANDS 18, 23 (May, 1984) (quoting Capt.
T.A. Brooks, CinClant Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence).
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weapons or the ammunition stocks needed for a protracted action;
thus, maintaining a belligerent position would entail a useless loss
of human life."' 2
A U.S. military intelligence officer stated that U.S. intelligence
was aware that there were only "three or four dozen Cuban Army
regulars" in Grenada,' 3 and that "they were not organized into a
regular military unit, but were primarily advisers and instructors
to the Grenadian military.' 14 The officer also indicated that U.S.
intelligence was aware of the presence of about 600 Cuban con-
struction workers and that they were "lightly armed with personal
weapons."' 5 The workers were employed by the National Union of
Enterprises-Caribbean (UNECA), which was doing most of the
labor on the airport construction project under supervision of Ples-
sey, Ltd., a British firm that served as general contractor.' 6
U.S. military intelligence was probably also aware that of the
600 Cubans, approximately 100 were auxiliary personnel-clerical
and administrative staff, as well as teachers who provided high
school equivalency courses for workers17-and that most were be-
yond combat age.' 8 The workers had military training of a type
12. EDITORIAL DE CIENCIAS, supra note 1, at 40-41.
13. Berry, supra note 11, at 23. This coincides with figures given by the Cuban Govern-
ment. EDITORIAL DE CIENCIAS, supra note 1, at 300-14.
14. Berry, supra note 11, at 23. This also coincides with the Cuban version.
15. Id. This is in accord with the Cuban position on the issue. Cuba said in the Security
Council: "A group of Cuban workers in Grenada had been given light arms." U.N. CHRONI-
CLE, Nov. 1983, at 18. As indicated above, about 200 Cubans were captured carrying weap-
ons. It is unclear how many more than the 200 Cubans had previous access to weapons.
Interviews by the author with some of the Cuban workers suggest that the majority did not
have weapons. Interviews, Puerto Escondido, Cuba, May 11, 1984. Deputy Secretary of
State Dam was clearly wrong in asserting that the Cubans had "heavy weaponry." Situation
in Grenada: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 32 (1983) (Statement of Kenneth Dam, Deputy Secretary of State).
16. For a statement by Plessey that the airport was being constructed for civilian use,
see London Times, Nov. 1, 1983, at 6, col. 5; Le Monde, Nov. 1, 1983, at 3, col. 1; Toronto
Globe and Mail, Nov. 2, 1983, at 14, col. 1. U.S. officials exaggerated the military character
of the Cuban workers. Deputy Secretary of State Dam told a Senate committee: "[W]e
found in fact there were organized Cuban units. These were not just construction workers
helping out the poor Grenadian people to build a little airfield." Situation in Grenada,
supra note 15, at 16 (statement of Kenneth Dam, Deputy Secretary of State). A United
Nations development official reported that the Cuban Government opposed construction of
an airport at Port Salines, and had instead suggested expanding the existing airport at
Pearls. Toronto Globe and Mail, Nov. 4, 1983, at 14, col. 3.
17. This appears from the list of names, ages, and occupations of Cubans on Grenada as
of October 25, 1983, as published by the Cuban Government on November 4, 1983. EDITO-




given to adults in Cuba, but were not combat-ready. A U.S. Marine
Corps analysis referred to "the low state of training on the part of
the Cuban troops (actually only construction workers)."1 9 One
ranking U.S. officer said, after the invasion, that he had not ex-
pected the Cuban workers to fight,20 even though the intelligence
officer quoted above said that the idea that they might fight had
been contemplated."
While this intelligence officer stated after the invasion that
military intelligence had an accurate count of the Cubans in Gre-
nada, high Pentagon officials told the press during the invasion
that there were 1100. Only on October 30, 1983, did the Pentagon
revise its estimate downward to between 700 and 750,2 a range
close to the figure of 784 given by the Cuban Government." If the
Pentagon did overestimate the number of Cubans, then it may
have improperly portrayed the Cubans as a greater military threat
than they were in fact.
Another factor reducing the likelihood of a Cuban military re-
sponse to a U.S. invasion of Grenada-a factor most likely known
by U.S. military intelligence-is that relations were strained be-
tween Cuba and Grenada prior to the invasion.2 4 The Cuban Gov-
ernment had strongly criticized the Grenadian group headed by
General Austin and Bernard Coard for removing Maurice Bishop
from the position of Prime Minister.2 5 According to former
Grenadian Minister of Justice Kendrick Radix, relations between
19. Operational Overview, MARINE CoRPs DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION COMMAND
NEWSLETTER 31 (Jan.-Mar. 1984). The parenthetical phrase in the quoted material is part of
the original quote itself. This issue of the newsletter is devoted in its entirety to an analysis
of the military operation in Grenada. O'Shaughnessy writes that the workers "had for the
most part only the most rudimentary military training." H. O'SHAUGHNESSY, supra note 8, at
23. U.S. military officials in Grenada told reporters that most of the Cubans captured were
"only militia-trained construction workers." Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 7, 1983, at 1,
col. 4. This contradicted the (inaccurate) statement made by Adm. Wesley McDonald that
the Cubans housed at Point Salines were "well-trained professional soldiers" impersonating
construction workers. N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1983, at A7, col. 3. It also contradicted the state-
ment of Deputy Secretary of State Dam. Situation in Grenada, supra note 15, at 16.
20. Wash. Post, Nov. 9, 1983, at A34, col. 1 (Statement of Maj. Gen. H. Norman
Schwarzkopf).
21. Berry, supra note 11, at 23.
22. Wash. Post, Oct. 30, 1983, at Al, col. 5; N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1983, at At, col. 5.
23. EDITORIAL DE CIENCIAS, supra note 1, at 318.
24. Wash. Post, Oct. 27, 1983, at A10, col. 4 (press conference with Fidel Castro). H.
O'SHAUGHNESSY, supra note 8, at 148-50. The Cuban Government issued a statement on
October 21 denouncing "savage methods such as the physical elimination of Maurice
Bishop." N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1983, at A19, cols. 1-2.
25. EDITORIAL DE CIENCIAS, supra note 1, at 10.
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Cuba and the Revolutionary Military Council (Council) had so de-
teriorated that General Austin feared that the Cuban workers
might participate in a revolt against the Council in an effort to
reinstate Bishop. Radix reports that the Austin-Coard group
deployed troops to surround the Cuban workers, removing the
troops after the death of Bishop.26 A U.S. diplomat, who was in
Grenada on October 23 and 24, said that Major Leon Cornwall, a
ranking Council member, asked him for advice on establishing a
civilian cabinet because "they couldn't go anymore to the Cubans
for advice." He said, "the Cubans had already expressed their up-
set over the shooting of Bishop. '27
Another circumstance suggesting that the construction work-
ers were not intending to defend Grenada is that they apparently
did little to fortify their dormitory area. The Cuban Government
stated that there were no fortifications or trenches.28 The U.S.
Government has issued no detailed information on this point,
though one Pentagon official said "they [not indicating whether
Cubans or Grenadians] were very well dug in all around the area
[of the Point Salines airstrip]. '29 The Washington Post reported
that U.S. soldiers found a network of "hastily prepared" defensive
trenches apparently dug recently because they lacked camouflage
and communications lines.30 A Le Monde reporter who toured the
dormitories found only "two blinds, nothing more, [that] guarded
26. Grenada Update: Interview with Kendrick Radix, Former Minister of Justice, 2
NEWSLETTER OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF JURISTS 6 (1984). Several Cuban workers
indicated that the Revolutionary Military Council did not permit the workers to leave the
area of their dormitories or to work on the airstrip for four days following the killing of
Bishop on October 19. Interviews by author in Puerto Escondido, Cuba (May 11, 1984). The
Caribbean News Agency (CANA) quoted one of Bishop's aides as saying that shortly after
Bishop was released from house arrest by his supporters, he (the aide) drove to the Cuban
camp to convey Bishop's request for help. The report does not specify whether Bishop was
requesting personal protection or help in regaining power. The aide stated that the Cubans
(without specifying who) were sympathetic to 'the request but were unsuccessful in getting
through by telephone to Havana to find out what to do. Toronto Globe and Mail, Nov. 22,
1983, at 16, col. 4.
27. J. KWITNY, ENDLESS ENEMIES: THE MAKING OF AN UNFRIENDLY WORLD 416-17 (1983)
(quoting James Budeit, consular officer at the U.S. Embassy in Barbados). Budeit feared a
Cuban-promoted counter-coup against the Revolutionary Military Council.
28.. EDITORIAL DE CIENCIAS, supra note I, at 40. A Cuban military officer, Lt. Col. Or-
lando Matamoros L6pez, who participated in the hostilities, stated that he and several
others "were there in the parking lot at the entrance to the Mission [military mission lo-
cated near workers' dormitories] behind a wall that was less than a meter high, made of
cinder blocks of which the bullets went right through." EDITORIAL DE CIENCIAS, supra note 1,
at 221.
29. Wash. Post, Oct. 29, 1983, at A10, col. 1.
30. Wash. Post, Nov. 9, 1983, at A34, col. 2.
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the airport. They were quickly reduced to nothing." 3' The lack of
extensive fortifications is further evidence of the construction
workers' lack of intent to defend, because the Cuban Government
had been anticipating a U.S. landing at least since October 20,
1983.32
A French cameraman present during the invasion concluded
that the Cuban construction workers followed their instructions
not to retaliate unless fired upon. He videotaped Dr. Rafil Jim6nez,
a teacher at the American medical college, who said he encoun-
tered a Cuban worker near the Cuban dormitories, on the morning
of October 25, shortly before the Rangers landed. When Dr.
Jimenez asked why the Cuban workers were armed with weapons,
the worker stated that the workers anticipated a U.S. invasion but
"would not fire unless they were fired upon. '' 33
IV. COMMENCEMENT OF UNITED STATES-CUBAN HOSTILITIES
The Cuban Government has from the outset claimed that the
Rangers initiated the hostilities. In a note sent to the U.S. Govern-
ment at 8:30 p.m. on October 25, the Cuban Government formally
protested that the Rangers had attacked the construction work-
ers.3 4 The United States has released no statement about the com-
mencement of hostilities. Thus, it has not directly denied the Cu-
ban charge. The U.S. Interests Section in Havana sent a message
to the Cuban Government in the late afternoon of October 25, in
which it said it "regretted" the hostilities. The note stated:
"Lastly, it [the U.S. Government] regrets the armed clashes be-
tween men from the two countries and considers that they have
occurred due to confusion and accidents brought about by your
men's proximity to the area of operations of the multinational
troops."3 5 This note places no blame on Cuba for commencement
31. Le Monde, Nov. 1, 1983, at 3, col. 6.
32. This was the day when U.S. vessels en route to Lebanon from the United States
were ordered to sail towards the waters near Grenada. Report by Adm. Wesley McDonald,
Operation Urgent Fury Report: October 25-November 2, 1983, at 1 (1985) (unpublished
report).
33. NBC-TV, First Camera, aired Oct. 30, 1983. The cameraman is Michel Barboux.
See also TIME, Nov. 7, 1983, at 31 (observations by Dr. Ra.l Jim~nez).
34. EDITORIAL DE CIENCIAS, supra note 1, at 41. As indicated in note 5, supra, Ferch
confirmed the accuracy of this message to the author. In the Security Council debate over
Grenada, Cuba also charged the United States with attacking the workers, calling the U.S.
action against the workers a "cowardly surprise attack." U.N. CHRONICLE, Nov. 1983, at 18.
35. EDITORIAL DE CIENCIAS, supra note 1, at 41. H. O'SHAUGHNESSY, supra note 8, at 23.
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of the hostilities and comes close to acknowledging that the Rang-
ers initiated it.
While there has been no statement from the U.S. administra-
tion on the commencement of hostilities with the Cuban workers,
several officials made reference to the hostilities in such a way as
to suggest that it was the Cubans who initiated the hostilities. De-
fense Secretary Caspar Weinberger told a House Subcommittee:
We did broadcast to the Cubans as quickly as possible that
we were not attacking Cubans, and that they should not shoot at
us, because our aim was to liberate the American students -
American civilians there, and that we were dealing only with the
Grenadian Armed Forces.
They didn't heed that, and as a result, we had to use force."
Weinberger cited Cuban preparations as indicating that they re-
sisted the entry of U.S. forces. "[A]bout two days before we got
there, the Cubans sent a colonel and his staff, to take command of
the Cuban forces, and in that time, they improved the deploy-
ments and the defensive positions to resist a landing."3 Major
General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Deputy Commander of the inva-
sion, referred to "Cuban defenders on high ground overlooking the
9,000 foot runway at Point Salines" and said that they "put up a
spirited fight which occupied the American forces for much of the
first day of fighting."3 8 A Pentagon spokesperson said U.S. forces
engaged the Cubans because the Cubans started the shooting.3 9
The U.S. note further implies that fighting between the
Cubans and the Rangers commenced only after the initial fighting
between the Grenadians and the Rangers. Several sources reported
that Grenadian ermy units were defending the airstrip. The Wash-
ington Post cited "U.S. spokesmen" as saying that the Rangers at
The reference in the U.S. note to "multinational troops" is misleading. The troops were only
from the United States. Military personnel from other states did not participate in the ini-
tial assault on Grenada, and when they arrived they fulfilled policing functions and guarded
detainees but did not participate in combat. Operational Overview, supra note 19, at 23.
N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1983, at A12, col. 1.
36. Situation in Lebanon and Grenada: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Appropriations, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1983) (Statement of Caspar Wein-
berger, Secretary of Defense). Weinberger's mention of broadcasting a message to the
Cubans is probably a reference to the contact reported by the Cubans to have occurred at
1:45 p.m.
37. Id. at 40.
38. Wash. Post, Nov. 9, 1983, at A34, col. 1.
39. N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1983, at A7, col. 3.
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Point Salines had engaged both Grenadians and Cubans.40 The
Post quoted an eighteen year-old Grenadian army private, Oliver
Simmons, as saying that he had been in a trench near the Point
Salines airstrip with seven other soldiers, but that his unit did not
fire at the Rangers and instead waited for dark and slipped away
undetected.4 ' Two Cuban workers said that two Grenadian soldiers
on the runway had shot at Rangers during the Rangers' descent. 2
It is conceivable that Rangers, when firing at the Grenadians,
hit Cuban workers, who returned fire. The Rangers may have fired
at the Cubans thinking they were Grenadians. Cuban workers, in-
terviewed by the London Times, said that landing Rangers occu-
pied positions in the hills near their dormitories and commenced
firing.43 This assertion is consistent with a Pentagon statement
that shortly after the Ranger landing "Company A and Company
B of the 1st Battalion, each with 150 men, were dispatched to flank
the high ground overlooking the runway. '44 The Cuban dormitories
were located on the high ground.
Most of the Cuban workers interviewed placed the commence-
ment of hostilities to be between 7:00 and 8:00 a.m. (two hours
after the Rangers' landing).46  One Cuban worker reported as
follows:
I was at the old camp-the first one put up for the construction
workers there-and we heard several planes approaching at
dawn .... At about 5:30 a.m .... the first paratroopers landed
between the sea and the runway. From that moment on, we took
internal measures to defend ourselves if we were attacked and
took up our assigned positions. The first Cubans who were at-
tacked were those near the runway and that happened around
8:00. I was further north with a group of comrades.46
A Cuban Government communique issued at 10:07 a.m. stated that
40. Wash. Post, Oct. 28, 1983, at A16, col. 6. H. O'SHAUGHNESSY, supra note 8, at 19.
LATIN AMERICA BUREAU, GRENADA. WHOSE FREEDOM? 90 (1984).
41. Wash. Post, Nov. 6, 1983, at A20, cols. 4-5.
42. Granma Weekly Review, Nov. 20, 1983, at 5 (Interview with Orlando Delgado
Moreno and Armando Fernandez Hernandez). A Cuban military officer stated that
Grenadian anti-aircraft crews fired at "[s]ome [U.S.] planes [that] were shooting at the lo-
gistics base of the Armed Forces of Grenada." EDITORIAL DE CIENCIAS, supra note 1, at 221
(quoting Lt. Col. Orlando Matamoros Lopez).
43. London Times, Nov. 7, 1983, at 5, col. 2.
44. Wash. Post, Nov. 9, 1983, at A34, col. 3.
45. Interview by author at Puerto Escondido, Cuba (May 11, 1984).
46. Granma Weekly Review, Nov. 13, 1983, at 7, col. 1. Interview with Teodulo Garcia
Abreu, Party Secretary for the construction workers' contingent.
1986]
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
the Cuban workers were resisting "after three hours of fighting. ''14
This would indicate hostilities commenced at 7:00 a.m.
Some U.S. commanders have, however, acknowledged that ac-
cording to the instructions they received the Cuban workers' area
was a military objective28 Major Jim Holt, who arrived late on the
morning of October 25 as executive officer of the 2nd Battalion,
325th Infantry, 82nd Airborne Division, said that seizing the Cu-
ban work and living area was his unit's first objective.4
A report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) confirmed 7:00 a.m.
as the time of commencement of hostilities between the Rangers
and the Cuban workers:
B [Company], 1st Ranger Battalion, 75th Infantry, on the
western flank of the runway, started rolling up the flank of the
Cuban defensive position from west to east by 0700. The com-
pany first sergeant led a three-man team to assault a Cuban po-
sition, killing two Cubans and capturing [twenty-eight] more. B
[Company] rolled up the Cuban defenses until they reached the
main Cuban camp. Ranger snipers took Cuban mortar positions
under fire and killed or wounded 18 Cubans at ranges of 600-
1,000 meters.50
This language also indicates that the Rangers were the first to at-
tack. The aforementioned quote by Defense Secretary Weinberger
was contradicted by the JCS acknowledgement of the Rangers' at-
tack. The report responded to critics in Congress who said that the
Rangers made an assault from the front rather than from the
flank. The JCS report, which defends the Rangers' tactics, states:
"An analysis of Cuban defenses and the Ranger attack shows that
the attack was made at the flank of the main Cuban defense." 51
The JCS report further acknowledges that the Rangers' attack
on the Cuban workers had been planned in advance of the invasion
and therefore was not a mistake, as suggested by the State Depart-
ment note to the Cuban Government. Characterizing the scope of
the invasion, the JCS report states:
47. Granma Weekly Review, Oct. 30, 1983, at 3, cols. 1-2.
48. L.A. Times, Nov. 6, 1983, at 6, col. 5. G. SANDFORD & R. VIGILANTE, GRENADA: THE
UNTOLD STORY 10 (1985) (citing orders for the operation, which included securing the Cuban
area).
49. L.A. Times, Nov. 6, 1983, at 6, col. 2.
50. ARMY, Aug. 1984, at 32.
51. Id. at 33.
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The principal military mission was to rescue U.S. citizens
and other foreign nationals. In order to achieve this objective, it
was determined that Cuban and Grenadian forces would have to
be neutralized and a stable situation on the island achieved. 52
Regarding the Cubans at Point Salines:
The plan called for the capture of the two airfields on Gre-
nada to include the immediate neutralization of Cuban forces at
Point Salines Airfield. ... 53
The report states that the Rangers accomplished this aim:
The surprise airborne assault on Point Salines Airfield by
the Rangers effectively neutralized Cuban forces at the outset
and led to the capture of several hundred Cubans despite stiff
resistance.5 4
Apparently, ground combat between the Rangers and the Cu-
ban workers was not significant. This could be a further indication
of the Cuban workers' lack of intent to oppose the invasion. Ap-
parently no more than nine Rangers were killed in Grenada from
hostile fire and not all of these were at Point Salines;"1 some were
possibly killed by Grenadian soldiers. The Cuban workers had only
about 200 light weapons," hardly a match for U.S. troops with air
support. The Washington Post reported that "early impressions
and reports on the scale and intensity of the action. . .were exag-
gerated by the military, by the news media whose information ini-
tially was limited to what the Pentagon provided, and by pre-inva-
sion reports by the Grenadian junta of a coming bloodbath,
coupled with post-invasion Cuban propaganda about thefighting. ''157
The Pentagon had a motive to exaggerate the Cuban military
role, because it was evidently reluctant to admit that the
Grenadian army was putting up resistance to the invasion. "In this
52. Id. at 29.
53. Id. at 30.
54. Id.
55. Wash. Post, Nov. 6, 1983, at A20, col. 1. The Pentagon reported five Rangers killed
in the action at Point Salines - four in an ambush at the east end of the runway, and one
who was firing a machine gun. Wash. Post, Nov. 9, 1983, at A34, col. 3; A35, col. 1.
56. 4 0. UHLER & H. COURSIER, COMMENTARY OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, 49
(1958). Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger was exaggerating when he claimed that "al-
most all" the workers had weapons. N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1983, at A18, col. 3.
57. Wash. Post, Nov. 6, 1983, at A20, col. 1.
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war of propaganda, Washington wants to stress the role of the
Cubans in the resistance in order to better demonstrate the power
they achieved in Grenada-of whom [Grenada] only a small num-
ber of militia personnel would oppose the American ad-
vance-while Havana wishes to the contrary to demonstrate that
the resistance continues even without them.""
The Cuban Government had a motive to exaggerate the mili-
tary role of the workers, because it wanted to show the United
States that Cuban civilians, under a military command, could fight
well. The apparent reason was to show what might happen in the
event of a U.S. invasion of Cuba. According to Cuban Deputy For-
eign Minister, Ricardo Alarc6n, the fighting by the workers "is in-
tended to have a demonstration effect. . . .The Americans now
have to think of how many thousands of battalions they would
need to subjugate Cuba or Nicaragua if all their technical and lo-
gistical strength hasn't enabled them to take Grenada." 9
Few Cubans were shot in ground combat. Most of the Cuban
casualties resulted from aerial attack. This was reported by some
of the Cuban workers 0 and by a Washington Post reporter, who
wrote that most of the Cuban casualties came from "naval guns,
land-based artillery, Cobra helicopter gunships, AC130 gunships
and jets from the carrier. '61 The Post reporter further described
58. Le Monde, Oct. 28, 1983, at 3, cols. 2-3. Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 7, 1983, at
56, col. 1. A Guardian analyst wrote that the United States "over-reported the amount of
Cuban resistance, under-reported the Grenadian resistance." J. Steele, Guardian, Nov. 25,
1983, at 15, col. 3. O'Shaughnessy writes that "[t]he absence of the media from the invasion
gave the U.S. Government full opportunity to manage the news to its best advantage. It
allowed it to distort in specific areas: the impression conveyed to the world that the bulk of
the fighting was done by Cuban troops and that Grenadian resistance had been minimal. As
the invasion proceeded, the United States authorities inflated the number of Cubans on the
island to 1,600. This was reduced after Saturday, October 29, when the Cuban Government
published a list specifying the job descriptions of all the 784 Cuban personnel on the island.
The United States, thereafter, admitted that the Cuban tally was correct." H.
O'SHAUGHNESSY, supra note 8, at 204. An effort to exaggerate the Cuban role may also have
been the motive behind the dispatch to Cuba by the U.S. command of 37 corpses, only 24 of
which were acknowledged by the Cuban Government to be Cubans. Id. at 209. An effort to
exaggerate the Cuban role was probably the reason for the inaccurate statement that "the
entire Point Salines facility was Cuban-controlled and sealed off from Grenadians" made by
Adm. Wesley McDonald. Wash. Post, Nov. 1, 1983, at A22, col. 2. The Christian Science
Monitor reported that most journalists in Grenada felt that "in its eagerness to emphasize
the importance of the Cuban role in Grenada" the administration put out "a long string of
significant inaccuracies." Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 17, 1983, at 11, col. 3.
59. Wash. Post, Oct. 30, 1983, at A10, col. 5.
60. Interview by author at Puerto Escondido, Cuba (May 11, 1984).
61. Wash. Post, Nov. 6, 1983, at A20, col. 4.
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the Cuban fighting as "short-lived and spotty at best," basing this
account on interviews with U.S. military personnel.6 2 After the ini-
tial contact on the ground, the Rangers apparently called in aerial
attacks against the defenseless Cubans."
The circumstances surrounding the Rangers' landing were
such that had the workers intended to oppose the Rangers' entry
into Grenada, they could have done so. According to Admiral Jo-
seph Metcalf III, the U.S. plan had been to land the Marines at
Pearls Airport and the Army Rangers at Point Salines simultane-
ously at 5:00 a.m. As a result of an aircraft navigation problem,
however, the Rangers were delayed in arriving at Point Salines by
twenty-seven minutes."
The delay is significant for two reasons. First, it gave the Cu-
ban workers an opportunity to receive a warning that Marines had
landed at the Pearls Airport and that similar action was likely else-
where on Grenada. According to Admiral Metcalf, Radio Free Gre-
nada announced a call to arms between 0500 and 0530.66 Colonel
Pedro Tortol6 said he ordered certain workers who had arms to
take up defensive positions near the barracks prior to the first
wave of Ranger landings. 6 Thus, the Cuban workers had time to
prepare for action. It is important to note that they did not take
up positions that would have allowed them to shoot at the Rangers
as they dropped onto the runway, which was the only level ground
for a parachute drop or aerial landing.
Second, the delay meant that the first wave of Rangers to drop
onto the Point Salines airstrip did so when the sun was already
high enough to render them visible from the ground. Admiral Met-
calf stated that as a result of the twenty-seven minute delay, "we
lost the advantage of coming in at low light. '6 7 If the Cuban work-
62. Id.
63. Because the Cubans had only light weapons, "American helicopter gunships were
said to have operated with impunity, destroying, with heavy casualties, the main Cuban
position at the Point Salines airfield." N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1983, at A12, cols. 1-2.
64. Navy Times, Nov. 21, 1983, at 10 (Interview with Adm. Joseph Metcalf III).
65. Id.
66. Granma Weekly Review, Nov. 13, 1984, at 4, col. 2. The Washington Post reported
that the demotion in 1984 of Col. Tortolo, and of the other Cuban officers present in Gre-
nada, was for not fighting hard enough against the Rangers. Wash. Post, June 19, 1984, at
A4, col. 1. This report has been taken by some to indicate that the Cuban workers had been
ordered by the Cuban Government to resist the entry of the Rangers into Grenada, and that
they had not sufficiently done so. This failure by the Cuban officers is also consistent with
the Cubans having been attacked but then failing to fight well.
67. Navy Times, Nov. 21, 1983, at 10. It was dark at 5:00 a.m. when Marine units
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ers planned to shoot at the Rangers, they could have seen them
well enough to do so. A Pentagon official said the descending
Rangers presented "a perfect target for snipers."68
As the Rangers' planes approached Point Salines, they were
met by anti-aircraft fire from the hills above the airstrip. There is
no evidence that these anti-aircraft guns were fired by Cubans.
The workers were not trained to fire these fairly sophisticated ZU-
23 anti-aircraft guns. 9 According to a U.S. Marine Corps analyst,
"the Grenadian ZU-23 crews were among the most highly trained
members of the People's Revolutionary Army. Weapons were well
situated for point defense of key areas in St. George's as well as
the Salines and Pearls airfields. '7 0 There is nothing written in U.S.
military publications which suggests that the Cubans fired the
anti-aircraft guns.
The Cuban version of events as told by construction workers,
after their return to Havana, was found by foreign correspondents
to be credible.
The consensus here, nevertheless, is that the Cubans are
telling a straight tale.
They speak of how they saw the 82nd Airborne Division 71
parachuting down on to the Point Salines runway, believing that
the US forces had arrived simply to rescue and evacuate the
American medical students on the island. With instructions not
to fire unless they were attacked, the Cubans were given rifles
landed at Pearls Airport. See Operational Overview, supra note 19, at 8 (noting that some
Marine helicopter pilots used night vision goggles, which enabled them to identify appropri-
ate landing sites).
68. Wash. Post, Oct. 29, 1983, at A10, col. 1. This is true even though the Rangers
jumped from a low altitude. The planes made a second approach at 500 feet, a height that
made it harder for the Grenadian army's anti-aircraft guns to train on them. Wash. Post,
Nov. 9, 1983, at A34, cols. 1-2 (press conference of Gen. Schwarzkopf). From this height, the
Rangers were in the air only about twelve seconds. The Cubans apparently had about 200
rifles. Wash. Post, Nov. 6, 1983, at A6, col. 1 (reporting that 200 Cubans were taken prisoner
with rifles). If the Cubans had been deployed closer to the runway, which they would have
had time to do given the advance warning they had of the landing, and if 200 Cubans had
been shooting, it is likely that some of the Rangers would have been hit.
69. Lt. Col. Michael J. Byron, U.S. Marine Corps, Fury from the Sea: Marines in Gre-
nada, 110/5/975 U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 119, 123 (May 1984).
70. Id. For mention of a Grenadian soldier operating an anti-aircraft gun in St. George,
see NEWSWEEK, Nov. 7, 1983, at 75. O'Shaughnessy reported observing Grenadian crews op-
erating anti-aircraft guns. See H. O'SHAUGHNESSY, supra note 9, at 22.
71. The reference to the 82nd Airborne Division is an error. The 82nd Airborne Divi-
sion did not arrive until later that day by aircraft, and not by parachute. The U.S. forces
that arrived at Point Salines by parachute around 5:30 a.m. were U.S. Army Rangers.
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and ammunition, took up positions around their huts and in the
surrounding hills and watched while the Americans did the
same.
They say that very quickly the Americans opened fire. The
Cubans returned it immediately. Thereafter, naturally enough,
the accounts diverge.
But many of the Cubans make a single forceful point. If
they had intended to be the aggressors, they would have shot a
great number of the first wave of US troops as they dangled
from their parachutes in the sky. Their positions would have
been chosen with that in mind, and they would have made a
better job of holding off the invasion. 2
The paratroopers were not hit during the jump,73 but a num-
ber of Rangers reported finding holes in their parachutes after they
hit the ground.74 Their accounts give no indication whether the
holes were caused by anti-aircraft guns (being operated by
Grenadian PRA), or by small arms fire (in possession of both Cu-
ban workers and Grenadian soldiers), or both. If the holes were
caused by small arms fire, it seems unlikely that it came from the
Cuban workers, given their distance from the Rangers.
Two Cuban workers stated that as the paratroopers de-
scended, several were shot "on their way down by two Grenadian
soldiers on the runway, a long way from our camps. ' 75 Other work-
ers stated, "these brave soldiers were killed by the invaders, who
continued advancing toward our camp. After they had set them-
selves up in favorable positions, they began their attack [on the
camp]. ' ' 6
One Pentagon report stated that bullet holes in the parachutes
were caused by anti-aircraft fire. An official said that "an anti-air-
craft gun raked a line of paratroopers, shooting just a few feet too
high as the men jumped from their plane, and that when the rang-
ers reached safety, every one found bullet holes in his
parachute. '77
Colonel Tortol6 said that as he saw the paratroopers dropping,
72. London Times, Nov. 7, 1983, at 5, cols. 1-2.
73. Wash. Post, Nov. 6, 1983, at A20, col. 2.
74. Id.
75. Granma Weekly Review, Nov. 20, 1983, at 5 (Interview with Orlando Delgado
Moreno and Armando Fernandez Hernandez).
76. Id.
77. Wash. Post, Nov. 1, 1983, at A22, col. 2.
1986]
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
he told workers "to follow their instructions to occupy posi-
tions. . .in keeping with the strict orders not to interfere with U.S.
troops in their evacuation of the students and other U.S. citizens,
to be concerned solely with our camp, to hold it, to go out and
occupy our positions and to defend ourselves only in the event of
being attacked. 78
The Cuban version, that they were not offering opposition to
the landing, is reinforced by the fact that after the Rangers landed,
a number of the Rangers spent up to two hours removing barbed
wire and equipment obstructing the use of the Point Salines air-
strip for aircraft landings. 79 The Cuban workers could have occu-
pied positions closer to the airstrip and fired at the Rangers during
this period. There is no report of Ranger casualties during the
clearing operations. If such firing on the Rangers did occur, it
could not have been intense.80
The Cuban construction workers had some, but limited, mili-
tary experience. Most of the workers were young enough to fire a
rifle but were well beyond military age. Hudson Austin asked the
Cuban Government to "subordinate the Cuban construction and
cooperation workers to the Grenadian Army" in order to help de-
fend against a U.S. landing.81 After the workers were attacked by
the paratroopers, many of them did in fact fight. There is no evi-
dence of collaboration between Colonel Tortol6 and the People's
78. Granma Weekly Review, Nov. 13, 1983, at 4, col. 1. See also Wash. Post, Oct. 28,
1983, at A9, col. 2. Fidel Castro told a CBS reporter at a news conference the night of the
invasion, that "it was the United States that initiated and has kept up the attack" on the
Cuban workers. EDITORIAL DE CIENCIAS, supra note 1, at 52. That same evening, at the
United Nations Security Council, the Cuban foreign minister characterized the combat in a
way that might suggest that the Cuban workers were defending Grenada from U.S. entry.
Referring to the workers, the minister said, "Despite their small numbers they were
steadfast in the defence of Grenada's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence,
even in the face of superior forces and equipment." Provisional Verbatim Record (2487th
mtg.) at 63, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 2487 (1983). This statement is inconsistent with the other
reported Cuban government statements, which stated that the workers were defending
themselves, not Grenada.
79. SOLDIERS, Jan. 1984, at 37, 39-41. Wash. Post, Nov. 6, 1983, at A20, col. 2. The
placing of the barrels on the airstrip a few days earlier led Plessey, Ltd., the British general
contractor at the airport, to inform the Revolutionary Military Council of Grenada that it
was suspending work on the project. H. O'SHAUGHNESSY, supra note 8, at 144. According to
one Cuban worker, the workers placed at least some of these obstacles on the airstrip. Al-
berto Diaz Calderon, a bricklayer, referred to "all the obstacles we'd placed on the runway a
time back." Granma Weekly Review, Nov. 13, 1983, at 7, col. 1.
80. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger said that U.S. forces had "removed [the ob-
stacles] under fire." Situation in Lebanon and Grenada, supra note 36, at 40.
81. EDITORIAL DE CIENCIAS, supra note 1, at 37.
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Revolutionary Army in planning to resist the U.S. landing.
Contrary to certain U.S. media reports, very few construction
workers escaped their camp area to fight from other locations. The
U.S. Department of Defense claimed that up to 500 Cubans fled
into mountainous areas, but later retracted this claim.2
The strongest evidence tending to show that the Cubans initi-
ated hostilities is (1) that they prepared defensive positions (albeit
rudimentary) and occupied them during the Rangers' landing,
rather than remaining in their dormitories; and (2) that the
Cubans were not willing to surrender.
The evidence that is available favors the Cuban version of the
invasion. It is well established that the Ranger-Cuban hostilities
commenced only about ninety minutes after the Ranger landing;
that Ranger-Grenadian hostilities preceded the Ranger-Cuban hos-
tilities; and that the Ranger-Cuban hostilities commenced only af-
ter the Rangers surrounded the Cubans. Given these facts, it would
have been foolish for the Cubans to commence hostilities; if they
had wanted to, they would have had a much better opportunity to
prevail had they commenced hostilities much earlier.
Cuba consistently denied initiating hostilities, while the U.S.
came close to admitting initiating the hostilities in its diplomatic
note to Cuba of October 25, 1983, and in the Joint Chiefs of Staff's
August, 1984, report.8 3 The Los Angeles Times was on-point when
it wrote: "U.S. commanders agree that certain Cuban positions
were made objectives of the military assault, and the Cubans say
their orders were to respond if attacked. This would account for
the fighting around the Point Salines airport."'
V. USE OF FORCE ISSUES IN THE UNITED STATES-CUBAN
HOSTILITIES
States are prohibited by international law from perpetrating
aggression against other states. There exist, however, possible jus-
tifications for the use of force. The United States argued that its
use of force in Grenada was justified, although the Cuban Govern-
ment argued that it was not. If the United States committed ag-
gression against Grenada, then any use of force by Grenada, or by
82. H. O'SHAUGHNESSY, supra note 8, at 210.
83. Supra notes 35 and 50-54.
84. L.A. Times, Nov. 6, 1983, at 6, col. 5.
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Cuba (if in response to a request for assistance from Grenada),
would be lawful, and the United States would be liable to Grenada
and Cuba under the law of state responsibility.
On the other hand, if the U.S. military action was justified,
then Cuba would be liable to the United States for using military
force to oppose U.S. entry. But if Cuba did not use military force
and the United States attacked the Cuban workers, then the
United States is liable to Cuba.
This issue will be considered on two hypothesis: First, that the
Cuban workers participated in the defense of Grenada by using
force to oppose U.S. entry; and second, that the Cuban workers did
not participate in the defense of Grenada but were attacked by
U.S. troops.
VI. RESPONSIBILITY FOR USE OF FORCE IF THE CUBAN WORKERS
WERE DEFENDING GRENADA
If the Cuban workers collaborated with the Grenadian Gov-
ernment in defending Grenada, then Cuba's action would be as
lawful as Grenada's action. If the Grenadian Government was act-
ing in self-defense, it could lawfully request assistance from an-
other state under article 51 of the United Nations Charter (collec-
tive self-defense).8 5 Grenada was acting in self-defense if it was
subjected to U.S. aggression. This appears to be the case, because
the justifications proffered by the United States for its invasion are
weak. Those justifications are as follows: (1) that the force was nec-
essary to rescue U.S. nationals; (2) that the force was in lawful re-
sponse to a request from the head of the Grenadian Government;
and (3) that the force was a lawful response to a request from the
Organization of East Caribbean States (OECS), a regional supra-
national organization. s6
With regard to the rescue of nationals, it is disputed whether a
state can use force.8 7 If it is illegal to use military force to rescue
one's nationals, then the Grenadian Government's military action
was clearly self-defense, and therefore legal.
The same is true if the rescue of nationals is permitted by in-
85. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
86. Robinson, Letter from the Legal Adviser, United States Department of State, 18
INT'L LAW. 381 (1984).
87. See Nanda, supra note 3, at 407-10 (review of writers with opposing views).
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ternational law, but the facts here do not justify invocation of that
doctrine by the United States. The facts are weak for the United
States, because of the following: (1) the United States has not
demonstrated that there were U.S. nationals in danger;8 (2) any
possible danger faced by U.S. nationals was less serious than the
danger created by the U.S. military action;8 9 (3) U.S. forces, upon
arrival, did not immediately endeavor to evacuate U.S. nationals;90
and (4) U.S. forces intended from the outset to remove the Gov-
ernment of Grenada and to establish a different Government, an
intent inconsistent with a rescue-of-nationals rationale.9 1
If the U.S. invasion was pursuant to a request from the head-
of-state of Grenada, then the Revolutionary Military Council was
88. The United States alleged neither actual harm to U.S. nationals nor any physical
situation that threatened such harm. The United States instead argued that there was a
possibility that U.S. nationals might be taken hostage but provided no support for such
fears. The Revolutionary Military Council had provided assurances of the U.S. nationals'
safety. In apparent control of the situation, they were able to provide such protection by
imposing an effective curfew. The United Kingdom, given the same facts, concluded that its
citizens were in no danger. See W. GILMORE, supra note 3, at 61-64. U.S. officials said that
Pearls Airport was closed on October 24, soon after the invasion, preventing the United
States from evacuating U.S. citizens. The administration acknowledged a few days later that
it had "since learned" that four charter flights arrived and departed on October 24 from
Pearls Airport. Wash. Post, Nov. 1, 1983, at A22, col. 1. A former U.S. official stated that he
flew out of Pearls Airport on a charter flight on October 24. N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1983, at
A7, col. 3.
89. A U.S. medical student, broadcasting over a ham radio from a medical school cam-
pus at Point Salines, described heavy firing by U.S. planes in the vicinity of the campus.
TIME, Nov. 14, 1983, at 70. U.S. commanders had not learned of the locations of U.S. medi-
cal students prior to landing in Grenada. In fact, the U.S. commanders were only aware of
one location, when in fact there were three. This made it impossible to evacuate the stu-
dents immediately upon arrival in Grenada. Wash. Post, Nov. 9, 1983, at A34, col. 1; Opera-
tional Overview, supra note 19, at 14; H. O'SHAUGHNESSY, supra note 8, at 219. The head of
the medical school stated that this delay meant that "if...they [the Revolutionary Military
Council] had wanted to take revenge on the United States for launching the invasion they
could have come on the campus and shot students." N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1984, at A10, col.
6.
90. Rangers landing at Point Salines did not immediately move in the direction of
those students located there but instead engaged in combat with Grenadian army forces and
Cuban construction workers. U.S. troops did not even reach a second, larger, group of medi-
cal students (at Grand Anse campus north of Point Salines) until the afternoon of the sec-
ond day after the landing. Wash. Post, Nov. 9, 1983, at A34, col. 1; Operational Overview,
supra note 19, at 18.
91. Upon arrival, U.S. forces distributed to the residents green handbills announcing
that they landed "to restore democracy." This indicated that the rescue of U.S. nationals
was not the sole aim of the landing. It also raises a possibility that it was a pretext for
initiating a political change in Grenada. H. O'SHAUGHNESSY, supra note 8, at 206. U.S.
Marine commanders, briefing subordinates prior to the landing, told them that the goals
were to neutralize the Grenadian army, evacuate U.S. nationals, and restore peace to Gre-
nada. Operational Overview, supra note 19, at 7.
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not really the Grenadian Government and the Council did not
have the authority to ask Cuba for assistance. The United States
claims that Governor-General Sir Paul Scoon was the sole lawful
authority, and not the Revolutionary Military Council, because of
the Council's lack of control. This justification is weak for four rea-
sons. First, it was not demonstrated that such a request was made
by Scoon. es Second, if such a request was made, it was made after
the U.S. President decided to intervene."3 Third, it is not clear that
Scoon, in his capacity as Governor-General, had the constitutional
authority to request foreign military intervention. 4 Fourth, the
Revolutionary Military Council was in sufficient control of Gre-
nada to be considered its Government, which means that Scoon
did not have the authority to request foreign military
intervention.9 5
If the U.S. action was in response to a request of the OECS,
then Grenada would have had to submit to the entry of the re-
gional organization's troops and could not request assistance from
Cuba to oppose such entry. This justification is not tenable, how-
ever, because the action was not a legitimate regional action under
the OECS Treaty. The Treaty requires unanimity of all member
92. The ECONOMIST concluded that "the Scoon request was almost certainly a
fabrication concocted between the OECS and Washington to calm the post-invasion diplo-
matic storm. As concoctions go, it was flimsy." ECONOMIST, Mar. 10, 1984, at 34. No written
request from Scoon was made public prior to the U.S. landing.
93. Scoon says he wrote a request letter to the Organization of Eastern Caribbean
States (OECS) on October 24. London Times, Nov. 1, 1983, at 1, col. 7. U.S. Marine com-
manders were informed of the code name for the operation (Urgent Fury) some time on
October 23, the time of its initiation (0500 Oct. 25), and that it would be a joint operation
with OECS nations. Operational Overview, supra note 19, at 4. A Navy source indicated
Sunday, October 23, at 1:00 p.m., as the time the commanders were told of the mission's
nature. Berry, supra note 11, at 19. On October 22 (Saturday), under Presidential direction,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff confirmed the mission's nature to Adm. Wesley McDonald, the
mission's commander. Adm. McDonald was informed of the code name (Urgent Fury) and
given the launch time of dawn, October 25. Lt. Col. Michael J. Byron, supra note 69, at 119,
124. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Langhorne Motley, told a
Congressional committee that Reagan "signed orders to prepare for a broader mission to
restore order in Grenada in cooperation with Caribbean forces" on October 22 (Saturday).
84 DEP'T ST. BULL., Mar. 1984, at 70.
94. London Times, Oct. 29, 1983, at 22, cols. 7-8; W. GILMORE, supra note 3, at 64-73;
Nanda, supra note 3, at 413-14; Toronto Globe and Mail, Nov. 5, 1983, at 20, col. 5 (quoting
Andrew Burgess, Law Faculty, University of West Indies, Barbados).
95. The Revolutionary Military Council was in peaceful control of Grenada even though
many Grenadians objected to the Council's overthrow of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop.
The Revolutionary Military Council had effectively shown its control by maintaining a
curfew.
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states,9 6 and authorizes regional military action only in response to
an outside attack.9 7 Neither factor was present.9 8
VII. RESPONSIBILITY FOR USE OF FORCE IF THE RANGERS
ATTACKED THE CUBAN WORKERS
If the Cuban workers did not participate in the defense of
Grenada and were attacked by U.S. forces, then the United States
may be responsible to Cuba even if the invasion of Grenada was
justified. The United States would not be responsible to Cuba pro-
vided the United States was pursuing a valid military objective.
The U.S. forces would not be justified in attacking the Cuban
workers if those workers constituted a non-military objective.9 9 A
resolution of the International Conference of the Red Cross ap-
proved by the United Nations General Assembly requires "that
distinction must be made at all times between persons taking part
in the hostilities and members of the civilian population to the ef-
fect that the latter be spared as much as possible."100 The principle
requiring a belligerent to distinguish between civilian and military
objectives has acquired the status of customary international
law.10 1 Another principle that has become customary in interna-
tional law is that civilians not engaging in hostilities against an in-
vader are not subject to capture. 102 These norms are reflected in
the 1977 Protocol I to the Geneva Convention (Geneva III), which
states that "parties shall distinguish between civilian population
and combatant and between civilian objects and military objectives
96. Treaty Establishing the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, June 18, 1981,
art. 8, 20 I.L.M. 1166 (1981) [hereinafter cited as OECS Treaty].
97. Id. art. 8.
98. Grenada did not participate in the vote, and it has not been suggested that Grenada
had been attacked by another state. Gordon, supra note 3, at 343.
99. Art. 7, Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Popu-
lation in Time of War, International Committee of the Red Cross, 1956. D. SCHINDLER & J.
TOMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND
OTHER DOCUMENTS 189 (1981). Article 6 provides that "attacks directed against the civilian
population ... are prohibited." Article 7 provides that "attacks may only be directed against
military objectives." Id. Hague Convention on Rules of Land Warfare, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 25
of the Annex, 36 Stat. 227, T.S. No. 539, 1 Bevans 631.
100. G.A. Res. 2444 (XXIII), Dec. 19, 1968, reprinted in D. SCHINDLER, supra note 99,
at 199, 195 (affirming Res., XXVIII, 20th International Conference of the Red Cross, Vi-
enna, 1965, titled Protection of Civilian Populations Against the Dangers of Indiscriminate
Warfare).
101. E. ROSENBLAD, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLIC. SOME As-
PECTS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF DISTINCTION AND RELATED PROBLEMS 60 (1979).
102. J.M. SPAIGHT, WAR RIGHTS ON LAND 306 (1911).
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and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military
objectives;" 103 that "civilian objects shall not be the object of at-
tack;" 10" and that "attack shall be limited strictly to military objec-
tives. ' 10 5 It does not matter whether the civilians are nationals of
the state being invaded, or nationals of a neutral or co-belligerent
state. 10
The only possible legitimate reason for U.S. forces to attack
the Cuban workers was that the workers were occupying a military
objective. Protocol I defines military objectives as "those objects
which by their nature, location, purpose, or use make an effective
contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruc-
tion, capture, or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the
time, offers a definite military advantage."' 0 7 The Cuban workers
were located in or near their dormitories which were located on a
hill in close proximity to a landing strip still under construction,
but capable of use by aircraft. A military airport is a military ob-
jective.10 8 The airstrip was not completed, but was capable of being
used by military aircraft and in fact was used by U.S. airborne
troops on October 25. Despite its status as a civilian airport,"0 9 the
area was defended by Grenadian forces who used anti-aircraft guns
to fire at U.S. planes as they dropped parachutists onto the air-
strip. The airport would seem to qualify as a military objective.
Housing for civilians who are constructing a military objective
is not a military objective. Castr~n writes that while munitions fac-
tories are military objectives, "the houses of those working in the
103. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 48, opened for
signature Dec. 12, 1977, official text published by the Swiss Federal Political Department,
Sept. 26, 1977, at 115-83.
104. Id. art. 52.
105. Id.
106. The mistreatment of Italian civilians in France by Germany during World War I
was characterized as a violation of the laws of war. C. PHILLIPSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE GREAT WAR 185-86 (1915).
107. Protocol I, supra note 103, art. 52, para. 2.
108. E. CASTREN, PREsENT LAW OF WAR AND NEUTRALITY 99 (1954).
109. London Times, Nov. 1, 1983, at 6, col. 5 (statement of Plessey Airports, Ltd., gen-
eral contractor). London Times, Nov. 8, 1983, at 15, col. 4 (letter of D.S. Collier, Managing
Director, Plessey Airports, Ltd.) (citing fact that fuel storage tanks being built above ground
indicated that the airport was not military). Le Monde, Nov. 1, 1983, at 3, col. 1 (quoting
Plessey spokesperson Tony Devereux that three facts show civilian character of airport: that
no below ground fuel storage tanks were built, that hangars were not made resistant to
aerial attack, and that the control tower was not protected from aerial attack). H.
O'SHAUGHNESSY, supra note 8, at 88, 96 (purpose of airport to promote tourism and ex-
ports), (International Monetary Fund approval of airport project).
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factories" are not.110 The proximity of the dormitories to the air-
strip does not alter their non-military status.
A belligerent must confine its use of force to objectives which
foster its military needs. What constitutes military necessity has
never been determined with precision. Spaight writes:
How close must the connection be between the act of devas-
tation and the operation of war to which it is ancillary? And this
question is closely followed by another, not less difficult-What
constitutes an imperative necessity of war? There is no concep-
tion in International Law more elusive, protean, wholly unsatis-
factory, than that of war necessity. One can only determine its
nature and scope by examining the actual events of war; theory
is of little help."'
This writer has discovered no precedent with facts similar to
those presented here, namely, a group of non-national civilians
who have armed themselves with intention to use those arms
against the belligerent only if fired upon, where that group is lo-
cated in a position near to, but not in the immediate vicinity of, a
military objective (an airstrip).
The Rangers could have accomplished their military objective
(taking control of the airstrip and ensuring the safety of the medi-
cal students) without engaging in combat with the Cuban workers.
First, there was the diplomatic option-negotiating the fate of the
workers with the Cuban Government. Had this been done prior to
the invasion, it would have indicated the U.S. plan to invade. The
plan, however, was already known in the Caribbean several days
prior to October 25, although the exact time of the landing was not
known. Thus, the U.S. forces would have relinquished surprise by
negotiating beforehand.
Another option was to invade without negotiations, but to an-
nounce to both the Cuban Government and the Cuban workers,
immediately after the invasion began, that the United States
would not harm the workers. The Rangers did approach the work-
ers during the first day of fighting, but only after the commence-
ment of hostilities. It is not clear just what was said to the Cuban
workers at that time, because the U.S. Army has not published its
version of the encounter.
110. E. CASTREN, supra note 108, at 199.
111. J.M. SPAIGHT, supra note 102, at 113.
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From the standpoint of the U.S. military commanders, such a
policy could have caused negotiations to drag on for some time,
leaving the Cuban workers' camp as enemy occupied territory and
causing some U.S. troops to stay behind to surround the workers,
while the remaining Rangers continued to the capital city of St.
George's. It seems, however, that this could have been done with-
out severely impeding the Rangers' military objectives. They could
have moved to the medical school and to St. George's quickly and
easily had they not engaged in combat with the Cuban workers.
There is a possibility, however, that the workers' dormitory area
might be considered a military objective regardless of its proximity
to the airstrip. Article 25 of the Hague Convention on Land War-
fare' 12 addresses attacks on undefended buildings. "The attack or
bombardment of towns, villages, habitations, or buildings which
are not defended, is prohibited."' Is This rule probably carries the
status of a customary norm. It is aimed at preventing a belligerent
from attacking when military necessity does not require it." 4 Does
article 25 apply to buildings which house armed civilians, where
those civilians do not plan to resist the invaders but are prepared
to return fire if fired upon?
The assumption underlying article 25 is that if a town, village,
habitation, or building is "defended," those inside are planning to
resist the invader. Endeavoring to define "defended" with respect
to a city, Fauchille writes that: "it must be a serious resistance, a
real defense manifesting itself in notched buildings, barricades, etc.
A few gunshots are insufficient to authorize recourse to bombard-
ment." 15 This definition suggests that the invader must have ei-
ther been fired upon in a serious way, or otherwise have good rea-
son to believe that the occupants plan to resist the invader. This
means that even if the firing between the workers and the Rangers
was initiated by Cubans, subsequent land and air bombardment of
their camp was not justified unless the firing initiated by the
Cubans was serious in nature.
Fauchille's definition also suggests that the fact that the Cu-
ban workers had weapons and had erected defensive positions does
112. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, An-
nex, art. 25, 36 Stat. 2277, 2302. T.S. No. 539, 1 Bevans 631, 648.
113. Id. art. 25.
114. D. SCHINDLER, supra note 99.




not necessarily indicate that their buildings were "defended." This
is also suggested by Geffcken, who states that "[t]he legitimacy of
the aggression does not depend on the fact of fortification but on
the defense of a place with arms in hand." '116 Geffcken indicates
that the rationale behind permitting a belligerent to attack a de-
fended city is that it is necessary to do so in order to take control
of the city. Where the occupants are not intending to resist unless
fired upon, however, it is not necessary to attack to gain control.
Castr6n criticized article 25 for failing to provide a definition
of the term "undefended." He states that "[t]he Conference proba-
bly adopted the view that in addition to actual defense it was pos-
sible to take into account the fact whether the area was fortified,
although the wording of the article would seem to point merely to
the first alternative.""1 This suggests that there must be some "ac-
tual defense," meaning resistance manifested by the occupants.
Castr~n reinforces this view by stating as follows:
An attacking force should not in any case be allowed to
open fire before the enemy has begun to offer some resistance. It
might perhaps be suggested that the attacking force first inquire
whether the area concerned will be surrendered without resis-
tance, but this would entirely rule out the advantages afforded
by a surprise attack.11
Castr~n assumes that the occupants of the area in question are
nationals of the enemy and are combatants. Where neither of these
facts is apparent, as here, the invading force must be considerably
more circumspect before attacking. A group of non-nationals are
less likely to offer resistance, especially if they are not members of
an organized military force.
Castr~n suggests that the invaders should inquire as to
whether the occupants will surrender. This suggestion is based on
an assumption that they are enemy nationals and combatants, be-
cause non-nationals need not surrender. Non-nationals are entitled
to safe passage out of the invaded state. This fact, as indicated
above, seems to have been the breaking point in the negotiations
between the U.S. forces and the workers on October 25. The U.S.
116. Geffcken, Incidents de droit international dans la guerre civile du Chili, 23
DESIGNENT LA REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DE LEGISLATION COMPAREE, PUBLIEE A BRUX-
ELLES 580 (1891).
117. E. CASTREN, supra note 108, at 198.
118. Id. at 198-99.
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forces said they did not want to fight the Cubans, and the Cubans
said they would neither resist nor surrender.
If the Rangers did initiate hostilities, and if no justification for
that initiation is to be found in the rules of warfare, another set of
issues arises. Those issues involve the manner in which the Rang-
ers initiated the hostilities. The precise circumstances may never
be clarified, but there are a number of variants. One possibil-
ity-the least favorable to the United States-is that the Rangers
understood that the Cuban workers were not trying to prohibit
U.S. entry into Grenada or their passage to further points, but
nevertheless initiated hostilities against them. Such a determina-
tion by the Rangers (to initiate hostilities) might have been based
on a military judgment to eradicate all possible opposition, and the
fact that the Cubans were not flying a white flag of surrender.
There exist a number of other possibilities. One can hypothe-
size the following: (1) that the Rangers fired at Grenadian defend-
ers and hit Cubans by accident; (2) that the Rangers saw Cubans
in their defensive positions, identified them as Cuban, assumed the
Cubans were part of the defense of Grenada, and opened fire on
them; (3) that the Rangers did not distinguish between the
Grenadian soldiers and the Cuban workers and engaged the work-
ers thinking them to be Grenadian soldiers; and (4) that the Rang-
ers identified the workers as Cubans, intended not to shoot at
them, but shot them nonetheless. The Ranger-Cuban hostilities
may have been started by a minor incident-one Ranger shooting
at one Cuban worker-leading to a reaction by other workers and
counter-reaction by the other Rangers. These various possibilities
raise an issue not frequently faced in the law of armed conflict. If
an invading army engages civilians without intending to do so,
what are the criteria in determining its legal responsibility?
At the outset, it would seem that the United States, under
such circumstances, would not be responsible for aggression
against Cuba. The definition of aggression given, for example, by
the United Nations General Assembly in Resolution 3314,"19 does
not include attacks on citizens of a state not party to an armed
conflict, but who are located in the territory of the conflict. The
United States' aggression was against Grenada. Its responsibility to
Cuba comes through the general principles of state responsibility
for endangering the lives of Cuban nationals. The possible respon-
119. G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
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sibility of the United States is not dependent on the fact that the
action took place in a third state. If those same U.S. forces were in
Cuba or in the United States, and a group of Cuban civilians were
in the vicinity of their operations, the United States would be
under an obligation not to harm those civilians.
One issue in determining the invading state's legal responsibil-
ity is whether, with respect to infliction of injury by the military
forces of a state against the nationals of another, responsibility ex-
ists only if the injury is inflicted intentionally, or whether responsi-
bility lies even if those forces inflicting the harm acted without in-
tent. Several possibilities arise. The state could be responsible: (1)
only if it or its agents were aware that they were engaging in acts
that might lead to injury; (2) only if it or its agents were reckless in
bringing about the harm, that is, they were aware of a risk that
their acts might bring about the harm but they acted in disregard
of that risk; (3) only if it or its agents were negligent in inflicting
the harm; or (4) regardless of the animus with which the harm was
inflicted (strict liability).
The law of state responsibility favors the strict liability ap-
proach. A state is typically responsible for harm inflicted by it or
its agents regardless of animus.120 The municipal law analogy is to
tort rather than to crime. Certain types of state responsibility may
require animus (for example, a state has a duty to protect consular
premises but is not responsible if it would have been impossible to
avert the harm), but generally no animus is required. This is defi-
nitely the case where a state's agents directly cause harm, as where
a state's troops shoot at nationals of another state.
One can see an analogy between state responsibility for injury
and state responsibility for aggression. A state is responsible for
aggression if its forces initiate combat against the forces of another
state, even if the forces initiating the combat do so
inadvertently.'21
The activity of the Cuban workers is a potentially compli-
cating circumstance. Clearly, the United States is responsible if its
forces attacked a group of Cuban civilians. But is this the result
where, as here, the Cuban civilians had weapons and were
deployed in a military fashion under the direction of military of-
ficers? Should this be considered akin to contributory fault on the
120. I. BROWNLIE, STATE RESPONSIBILITY: PART I, 39 (1983).
121. I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 377-78 (1963).
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part of Cuba - that it put its civilians, who were in a combat
zone, in a situation that made it appear that they might be plan-
ning to engage in hostilities?
The activity of the Cuban workers is irrelevant in determining
the responsibility of the United States. Where no animus is re-
quired on the part of the United States, there is no animus to be
negated by any possible contributory fault on the part of Cuba.
The United States is strictly liable. However, a tribunal adjudicat-
ing U.S. responsibility might take this circumstance into account
in awarding damages to Cuba.
There is another possibility that needs to be considered. It is
conceivable that the Cuban workers were instructed to fire only if
fired upon, and that they intended to follow that directive, but
that some circumstance led some, or even one, of them to initiate
hostilities. One can imagine circumstances, other than firing by the
Rangers, that might lead a Cuban to fire a rifle in the Rangers'
direction. A Cuban might have seen a flash in the sky and assumed
it to be a shot coming in his direction; a Ranger might have shot at
a Grenadian army defender, but a Cuban might have thought the
shot to be against Cuban positions; the rifle of a Ranger might
have discharged accidentally; a Cuban (or Cubans), seeing the
Rangers encircling their positions, might have assumed the Rang-
ers would attack and therefore fired first, either based on a tactical
decision, or simply out of fear. Under such circumstances, a Cuban
might have fired an initial shot that could have led the Rangers to
respond, leading to a general exchange of shots.
With such a scenario, the United States could conceivably be
held responsible on the theory that its forces assumed positions
encircling the Cubans, and thereby led the Cubans to believe they
were about to be assaulted and that they had to fire first in self-
defense. One can imagine that from the standpoint of the Cubans,
the circumstances might have appeared to represent a high likeli-
hood of imminent attack. This would satisfy the standards for self-
defense under customary law as reflected in the principles estab-
lished by the Caroline incident, 122 or the principles in municipal
penal law.123
122. 2 J. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 412 (1906).
123. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 393 (1972). Criminal Code of
the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, art. 13, as construed by B.S. Nikiforov
(ed.), NAUCHNO-PRAKTICHESKII KOMMENTARII UGOLOVNOGO KODEKSA RSFSR [Scholarly and
Practical Commentary to the Criminal Code of the RSFSR] 33 (1963). Both indicate that
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Circumstances such as these might well negate any claim for
responsibility that the United States might bring against Cuba,
but would they render the United States responsible to Cuba? It
seems that they might. A state should not permit its armed forces
to so intimidate civilians of another state that those civilians be-
lieve that they need to use force to protect themselves. When a
state does allow its armed forces to intimidate civilians of another
state it should be held responsible.
Cuba urged other states to condemn the United States for as-
saulting its workers, but no other state became involved.' 2 The
general lack of clarity in the circumstances of the "assault" may
account for the reluctance on the part of those states. Cuba
strongly condemned the United States for its action against its
workers. It did not, however, make a formal claim for compensa-
tion from the United States.
VIII. STATUS OF CUBAN WORKERS AFTER CAPTURE
Another issue arising out of the United States-Cuban hostili-
ties is the status of the Cuban workers after they were captured by
U.S. forces. The U.S. forces apparently considered those Cubans
carrying weapons when captured as combatants (about 200), and
the others as civilian internees (about 400).12 5 If the Cuban work-
ers were defending Grenada, the question becomes whether the
U.S. forces were bound to consider the Cubans engaged in combat
as combatants, or whether it could have considered them to be
persons not entitled to engage in combat, and, hence, criminals
subject to punishment for their use of armed force. If, on the other
hand, the Cuban workers were attacked by the U.S. troops, the
question becomes whether the U.S. forces should have considered
all the Cubans to be civilian internees rather than combatants.
IX. STATUS CUBAN INTERNEES WOULD ENJOY IF THEY INITIATED
HOSTILITIES
The first issue is whether, if the Cuban workers initiated com-
the defense of self-defense is available if it is apparently, though not actually, necessary to
use force against the supposed attacker.
124. Cuba reportedly encouraged other states to condemn the United States for its ag-
gression against Cuba. Wash. Post, Oct. 28, 1983, at A9, cols. 2-3.
125. Le Monde, Nov. 1, 1983, at 3, col. 5.
1986]
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
bat with the Rangers, the Cubans were entitled to be considered
combatants upon capture. Civilian non-nationals rarely take up
arms against an invading army.126 Therefore there is little prece-
dent for the United States-Cuba hostilities on the hypothesis that
the Cubans acted to oppose the entry of the U.S. troops.
Article 4 of Geneva 111127 defines prisoners of war. Paragraph
(A)(6) of article 4128 is the only section which one can, arguably,
apply to qualify these Cubans as prisoners of war. Paragraph
(A)(6) reads as follows:
Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the ap-
proach of the army spontaneously take up arms to resist the in-
vading forces, without having had time to form themselves into
regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and re-
spect the laws and customs of war. 129
If the Cubans do not qualify as prisoners of war under article 4,
then they would be subject to criminal punishment for their oppo-
sition to the U.S. invasion. The U.S. forces, however, considered
the Cubans as combatants and treated them as prisoners of war
rather than as criminals. The issue is whether the humanitarian
law required the U.S. forces to accord these Cubans that status. If
it did not, then an invading force, like that of the United States in
Grenada, would be free to punish resisting non-national civilians,
even to the point of executing them. While the United States did
not seek to punish the Cubans for participation in the hostilities,
the events in Grenada squarely raise the issue and provide an op-
portunity for considering both the state of the law and its possible
reform.
The question is whether non-nationals of an invaded state who
resist an invading army are entitled to be treated as prisoners of
war. Article 4(A)(6) accords prisoner of war status to "inhabitants"
only. This raises the question of whether the Cuban workers were
"inhabitants" of Grenada. This question requires an examination
of the rationale for article 4(A)(6).
The situation contemplated by article 4(A)(6) is called a "ris-
126. If foreigners enlist in the army of a belligerent, which was not the situation here,
they are entitled to be treated as combatants by other belligerents. J. BAKER, LAWS OF LAND
WARFARE CONCERNING THE RIGHTS AND DUTIEs OF BELLIGERENTS 24 (1919).
127. Geneva III, supra note 4.
128. Id.
129. Geneva III, supra note 4, art. 4(A)(6).
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ing in mass" (French leve en masse). This first appeared in hu-
manitarian law in the nineteenth century in order to protect civil-
ians who defend against an invasion, even if they had not been
asked to do so by their government. The major powers opposed the
concept, but the smaller powers prevailed.1 30 The latter argued
that such spontaneous citizen units could be vital in defense
against larger powers. '1 An 1874 Brussels conference of European
states included in its draft articles on humanitarian law a provision
rendering those participating in a levee en masse as prisoners of
war upon capture." 2
Ariga, who attended the 1874 conference as a member of the
Japanese delegation, describes the differences of opinion over the
levke en masse as follows:
The countries that have large armies through a system of
conscription-Germany principally-insisted that only those in-
dicated by [a]rticle 1 should be considered belligerent; [article 1
referred to regular armies.] they stated that if all the inhabitants
can fight without limitation, [a]rticle 1, which limits belligerent
status to four essential conditions, becomes entirely useless; that
the invading army will have no way to distinguish peaceful in-
habitants from combatants, which could lead it to consider all
the inhabitants as active enemies and to fight them. But the
smaller states replied. They declared that if they are not con-
strained to maintain a large army based on conscription, they
have nevertheless the right to defend their countries in case of
need and that therefore they must be able to have recourse to a
levee en masse.'33
Ariga writes that it was the inability of the two groups of
states to agree on the concept of lev&e en masse that led to the
failure of the European states to turn the Declaration of Brussels
into a treaty.134 The major powers refused to agree to the 1874 lan-
130. Phillipson writes that levee en masse was recognized as a norm of customary inter-
national law by the period of the Franco-Prussian War (1870), although Germany did not
observe the norm during that war. C. PHILLIPSON, supra note 106, at 119. On development of
the leve en masse norm in the late nineteenth century, and in particular, its non-applica-
tion to inhabitants of occupied territory, see G. BEST, HUMANITY IN WARFARE 190-200 (1980).
131. P. FAUCHILLE, supra note 115, at 105.
132. Project of an International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War,
Aug. 27, 1874, art. 10, 1873-1874, 65 Brit. For. & State Papers 1005, 1007. P. FAUCHILLE,
supra note 115, at 105.
133. N. ARIGA, LA GUERRE Russo-JAPoNAISE Au POINT DE VUE CONTINENTAL ET LE




guage, even though the lesser powers had compromised by includ-
ing a phrase that would limit a lev&e en masse to territory "not yet
occupied upon the approach of the enemy."'1 5 This precluded citi-
zens from rising up after an invader occupied a territory.
The same issue divided the 1899 Hague conference, but there
the major powers agreed to the 1874 compromise. The 1874 lan-
guage was written, without change, into the 1899 Hague Conven-
tion (II) with respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land. 136
It was carried over into the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) with re-
spect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land,137 with the added
requirement that civilians openly carry arms. The 1929 Geneva
Convention (Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War) incor-
porated by reference the definition of prisoner of war contained in
the 1907 Hague Convention,13 and the 1907 language was written,
without change, into the 1949 Geneva Convention (Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War) as article 4(A)(6)."s9
The rationale behind the concept of levee en masse is that the
civilian inhabitants of an invaded territory have a right to defend
their country. Their action, being legitimate, causes them to be
considered prisoners of war if captured. The major powers objected
to the concept of levee en masse because, they argued, it is difficult
to identify the enemy if citizens are fighting.
In the few cases in which non-nationals of an invaded territory
have risen up in mass to oppose an invader, state practice is not
clear; publicists generally have concluded that such non-nationals,
when captured, do not enjoy prisoner of war status. In what was
apparently the first example, following the Hague Convention of
1899, of non-nationals rising in mass to oppose an invader, Japa-
nese residents of the Chinese Manchurian city of Yingkow (also
known Newchawng) armed themselves without being organized by
the Japanese or Chinese Governments, and opposed an attack by
Russian troops in January of 1905.140 One publicist, Rey, was of
135. Id. At the 1899 conference, Great Britain and Switzerland said that inhabitants of
occupied territory should have the right to rise in mass, but the major powers rejected the
idea. 2 J. DE LOUTER, LE DRorr INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POSITIF 255 (1920).
136. Annex, art. 2, 32 Stat. 1803, 1812, T.S. No. 403, 1 Bevans 247, 253.
137. Annex, art. 2, 36 Stat. 2277, 2296, T.S. No. 539, 1 Bevans 631, 644.
138. Art. 1, 47 Stat. 2021, 2030, T.S. No. 846, 2 Bevans 932, 938.
139. Geveva III, supra note 4. Suggestions for change were defeated at the 1949 Geneva
conference. 2-A FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF GENEVA OF 1949, at 239,
420-22 (n.d.) [hereinafter cited as FINAL RECORD].
140. Rey, Chronique des faits internationaux, 16 REVUE GENERALE DE DROrT INTERNA-
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the opinion that this did not constitute a valid leve en masse,
although the contrary was suggested, because the Japanese resi-
dents were not nationals of the invaded territory."" Justifying this
conclusion, Rey wrote:
What was always kept in view at Brussels in 1874, as at the
Hague in 1899 and 1907, to authorize the exceptional practice of
a lev&e en masse, it is a spontaneous rising of the population to
defend the national territory: the defense of the native land in-
voked by the lesser states in favor of the levee en masse was a
sufficiently powerful reason to permit a derogation from the
rules of the laws of war in favor of the inhabitants, and in ab-
sence of this essential condition, the general rule of article 1 [re-
quiring regularly organized forces] resumes its sway.'42
Fauchille, another publicist, also thought the action of the
Japanese residents of Yingkow did not constitute a valid levee en
masse. Referring to this incident, he wrote, "It is the 'population
of unoccupied territory' that has the right to take up arms. It has
on that basis been maintained that those other than nationals of
an invaded territory may not participate in a levee en masse.' 43
A second incident raising this same issue also occurred during
the Russo-Japanese War. On July 10, 1905, Japanese troops invad-
ing Sakhalin Island (Russian territory) attacked the city of
Vladimirovka. They were opposed by a force consisting largely of
Russians who had been deported from European Russia to Sakha-
lin for criminal offenses. The Japanese took 150 of these Russians
as prisoners and sentenced 120 of them to death in a court-martial
proceeding.
The Japanese Government defended its refusal to consider
this rising a levge en masse, in part, because it did not consider the
deportees "inhabitants." Rey explains this argument as follows:
But it is suggested that they [the Russian prisoners] could no
longer rely on [a]rticle 2 of this regulation [the 1899 Hague Con-
vention] regarding leve en masse "because article 2 contem-
plates ordinary inhabitants taking up arms to defend their
houses, their property, their native land, whereas defenders of
Sakhalin were convicts or vagabonds without houses, without
TIONAL PUBLIC 481, 501 (1909).
141. Id. at 502.
142. Id. at 501.
143. P. FAUCHILLE, supra note 115, at 107. Fauchille cites Rey as authority.
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property, and who had no native land. They knew nothing of the
laws of war." For this reason they were treated like miscreants
subject to martial law. 1 4
While Ariga agreed with this reasoning, 14 5 Rey objected to the
Japanese version. Rey argued:
This reasoning does not convince us, and the conduct of the
Japanese army in this situation did not conform to the law of
war. . . . To say that these inhabitants were miscreants or
vagabonds without homes or a native land is an affirmation con-
tradicted by the facts, since the island of Sakhalin had a free
Russian population of 12,000 inhabitants and since, of the
22,000 exiles, 6000 were peasants who conducted agricultural
work. 4"
The Japanese view was that to be qualified as an "inhabitant,"
a person had to be defending his home. Rey does not dispute this
point but asserts that many of the Russians who rose up were in
fact defending their homes. Thus, both agree that an exile does not
qualify as an "inhabitant." This view is shared by Lawrence, who
wrote of the Russian citizen action at Vladimirovka: "If they
claimed to be a popular levy resisting invasion by a spontaneous
impulse, they were not inhabitants. . . . The decision to execute
them was probably right, since they satisfied the conditions of
neither kind of irregular belligerency. 1147
Takahashi cites one example of non-nationals forming an
armed force to oppose an expected invader which he deems a legit-
imate levee en masse. The incident, also from the Russo-Japanese
War, occurred when a Russian attack was expected in the city of
Kwangju, Korea, which was occupied by Japan but not yet an-
nexed to it. As Korean forces were deemed insufficient for defense
of the city, forty-eight Japanese residents organized themselves
into a military force led by a representative of the Japanese consu-
late at Kwangju. The group never engaged in combat (the Japa-
nese First Army arrived before the Russian army), so the legiti-
144. Rey, supra note 140, at 500. N. ARIGA, supra note 133, at 87. Another Japanese
author found that the Russians at Vladimirovka did not constitute a levee en masse but
relied for that conclusion solely on the ground that they did not respect the laws of war. J.
SHINOBU. INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE SHANGHAI CONFLICT 69 (1933).
145. N. ARICA, supra note 133, at 87. The language is that of a Capt. Yamamoto, Ariga's
former student. Ariga quotes Yamamoto and then agrees with him.
146. Rey, supra note 140, at 500.
147. T. J. LAWRENCE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 495 (1925).
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macy of the volunteers' status was never tested. 48 Takahashi
considered this action to be a valid levee en masse. Perhaps
Takahashi believes that Japan's status in Korea was tantamount
to sovereignty, so that the volunteers could be considered to be in
their native land. This is a difficult view to maintain, however, be-
cause Takahashi does not address the issue of the volunteers'
nationality.
Another example of a publicist considering a levee en masse
by non-nationals to be valid is Ariga's analysis of the Japanese Ci-
vilian Corps at Yingkow in January 1905, considered above.149 As
indicated, Rey and Fauchille concluded that these civilians did not
constitute a legitimate levee en masse, because they were not na-
tionals of China.' But Ariga found that they did constitute a le-
gitimate levte en masse.'15 Ariga does not address the fact that the
Japanese were non-nationals of the territory in question. Ariga
does, however, analyze the legal status of Yingkow in a separate
section of his book on the 1905 War. He explained that the Rus-
sians held the territory from the Boxer Rebellion, until the Japa-
nese drove them out in July 1904.152 Ariga described Yingkow dur-
ing the 1905 War as follows:
[D]uring the war there was in this city a Japanese military ad-
ministration and a Japanese consulate. The consul had only the
powers conferred on him by the treaty of commerce with China;
as for the commissioner of the military administration, he exer-
cised both administrative and judicial powers. Foreign consuls
were unanimous in recognizing the right of the commissioner to
govern the city, as the Russian administrator had done
formerly. 53
The implication of Ariga's analysis is that the Japanese had
sufficient authority in Yingkow; therefore a rising of Japanese civil-
ians to defend the city from a Russian attack could be considered
an uprising of inhabitants. Ariga does not argue that the Japanese
volunteers might be members of a legitimate levte en masse re-
gardless of nationality. In fact, he insisted that the Russian depor-
148. S. TAKAHASHI, INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLIED TO THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 91-92
(1908).
149. Rey, supra note 140.
150. Supra notes 141-43.
151. N. ARIGA, supra note 133, at 84.
152. Id. at 71-72.
153. Id. at 73.
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tees of Vladimirovka could not be considered members of a legiti-
mate levee en masse, because they were not nationals of
Sakhalin.14
While Ariga showed no regret over the execution of the Rus-
sian civilians who fought at Vladimirovka, he showed great solici-
tude for the Japanese Civilian Corps at Yingkow. "How great
would have been our indignation," he writes, "if, taken by the en-
emy, these defenders, armed with pistols and daggers, had been
shot as criminals!" ' Ariga's concern for the Japanese civilians at
Yingkow, like Takahashi's for the Japanese civilians at Kwangju, 166
may simply reflect the sentiments of nationalism.
The discussions leading to the inclusion of article 4(a)(6) in
the 1949 Geneva III Convention apparently did not touch on the
nationality issue.1 57 Most recent analyses of the levke en masse are
also silent as to the nationality issue.158 But, publicists McDougal
and Reisman state that the doctrine of levee en masse is "a con-
cession to the perspectives of patriotic nationalism which presuma-
bly motivate the uprising," a view that seems to limit the doctrine
to nationals of the invaded state.159
The issue of levee en masse was not mentioned in the 1977
Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12,
1949, although certain provisions of the Protocol affect the status
of a non-national participating in a levee en masse. Article 45(3)
states, for example, that any person who participated in hostilities
and who does not benefit from the Geneva IV convention is none-
theless entitled to certain guarantees enumerated in article 75 of
the Protocol. Article 75 prohibits, among other things, murder, tor-
ture, and corporal punishment against such a detainee but does
not preclude court-martial for actions related to the armed con-
flict. Presumably, a belligerent is entitled to consider the non-na-
154. Id. at 87.
155. Id. at 89.
156. S. TAKAHASHI, supra note 148.
157. 3 J. PREux, COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949 67-68 (1960). The
only reported discussion of levee en masse at the 1949 Geneva Convention appears in FINAL
RECORD, supra note 139, at 239, 420-22. The issue regarding the nationality of those rising
in mass was not addressed.
158. M. GREENSPAN, MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 62-64 (1959); A. RoSAs, LEGAL STA-
TUS OF PRISONERS OF WAR: A STUDY IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN
ARMED CONFLICTS 375-78 (1976); DEP'T OF THE ARMY, LAW OF LAND WARFARE (FIELD MANUAL
27-10) 28 (1956).




tional's participation in the uprising as illegal and thus be permit-
ted to court-martial him, imposing even the death penalty.
While Geneva III and the 1977 Protocol brought nothing new
on the nationality issue, it should not be considered a closed sub-
ject. The infrequency of incidents in which non-nationals have
taken up arms against an invader accounts for the lack of attention
to the issue. If foreigners are residents in a state subject to inva-
sion and they decide to resist, either out of solidarity with the in-
vaded state or out of fear that if the invader gains control they
may be subjected to atrocities, the resistance should be considered
legitimate. The alternative-that the belligerent may consider the
resisters criminals and, after court-martial, execute them-is
harsh.
Non-nationals may feel the same outrage as nationals in the
face of an invasion, particularly if their residence in the invaded
state is one of long standing. They may have great sympathy for
their state of residence. Thus, the same psychological factors that
led to the right of levee en masse for nationals may in many situa-
tions apply as well to non-nationals.
Apart from the non-nationals' feelings of attachment, they
may simply fear the invading army. They may be concerned that it
will perpetrate atrocities that will affect them along with the na-
tionals. While concern for such fears does not appear to have been
considered in the decision to give a right of levee en masse, it is
harsh to treat a group of civilians who organize themselves to op-
pose an invader whom they fear may slaughter them as criminals.
The question of the status of non-national civilians who op-
pose an invader must in the first instance be addressed under Ge-
neva III. As indicated, the history of paragraph 4(a)(6) strongly
suggests that the intent of the drafters of that provision and its
antecedents was to exclude non-nationals from the protection
given prisoners of war. The fact that the rule may be harsh is not
relevant, because a treaty is interpreted in light of the intent of its
drafters. A treaty's meaning does not change over time as concepts
change. 160 The only exception to this rule is that a treaty's princi-
ple loses force upon emergence of a new peremptory norm (jus
cogens),161 but any rule regarding resistance by non-national civil-
160. A. McNAIR, LAW OF TREATIES 365 (1961).
161. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
art. 64, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27, at 289 (1969), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
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ians is not likely to be denominated as peremptory.
The practice of states under a treaty may also be considered in
construing the treaty's terms. 62 The United States-Cuban incident
in Grenada, however, was the first incident since 1949, and there
are no recorded incidents during the entire period following the
Russo-Japanese War to consider.
The appropriate mechanism would be a revision of article
4(a)(6). The 1977 revisions resulting in the two protocols of that
year did not address the issue. For the reasons indicated above, it
would seem appropriate for Geneva III to be revised to include
non-nationals as legitimate participants in a levee en masse.
X. STATUS CUBAN INTERNEES WOULD ENJOY IF U.S. FORCES
INITIATED HOSTILITIES
Only in rare circumstances has an invading army attacked
non-national civilians. 163 There have been no prior incidents in-
volving attacks that appear similar to the Cuban version of the
events, that is, non-national civilians attacked without initiating
hostilities, yet also prepared to defend themselves if attacked.
If U.S. forces attacked the Cuban workers, then the workers
probably qualify for treatment as civilian internees under the 1949
Geneva Convention (Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War)(Geneva IV).1  They would seem to come within
the definition of "protected persons" under article 4 of Geneva IV,
and therefore be protected from mistreatment under article 27. If
some of the Cuban workers attacked the U.S. forces but others did
not (U.S. sources acknowledge that most of the Cubans did not
engage in hostilities), those who did not attack would seem to
qualify as "protected persons" under article 4. Article 4, paragraph
1, states: "Persons protected by the Convention are those who, at a
given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in
case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the con-
flict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals."1 65 Upon
162. Id. art. 31(3)(b).
163. On August 21, 1914, German troops invading France entered the village of Jarny
and found a group of Italians it suspected of having fought to defend the village. It arrested
a number of them and immediately shot them. C. PHILLIPSON, supra note 106, at 185-86.
164. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 72 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter cited as Ge-
neva IV].
165. Id. art. 4, para.1.
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being interned, the Cubans would qualify as being "in the hands"
of U.S. forces. "In the hands of" means "that the person is in the
territory which is under the control of the Power in question." 166
Shortly after interning the Cubans, U.S. forces were in control of
Grenada.
Article 4, paragraph 2, presents a potential obstacle in consid-
ering the Cubans "protected persons." It reads, in part, as follows:
Nationals of a neutral State who find themselves in the territory
of a belligerent State, and nationals of a co-belligerent State,
shall not be regarded as protected persons while the State of
which they are nationals has normal diplomatic representation
in the State in whose hands they are. 167
If, as we are assuming in this section, the Cubans were attacked by
the U.S. troops, Cuba would be a neutral state. Neutral-state na-
tionals are not considered "protected persons" because "the posi-
tion of neutrals is still governed by any treaties concerning the le-
gal status of aliens and their diplomatic representatives can take
steps to protect them.' 68
While Cuba and the United States do not have diplomatic
representation at the ambassadorial level, they both have an "in-
terests section" in the other's capital functioning as part of the em-
bassy of a third state. The Cuban Interests Section is part of the
Czech embassy in Washington, while the U.S. Interests Section is
part of the Swiss embassy in Havana.6 9 Pictet quotes approvingly
the rapporteur of the relevant drafting committee as stating that
normal diplomatic representation is "that which functions in peace
time comprising at least one diplomatic representative accredited
to a Ministry of Foreign Affairs.' 170 Pictet notes that in the French
text of the rapporteur's report, the phrase "accredited to" is ren-
dered as "trouvant audience aupr~s de."
The heads of the Cuban and United States Interest Sections
are not "accredited to" the foreign ministry of the other state, but
166. 0. UHLER & H. COURSIER, supra note 56, at 47.
167. Geneva IV, supra note 164, art. 4, para. 2.
168. 0. UHLER & H. COURSIER, supra note 56, at 49.
169. Note of U.S. Government to Cuban Government, Jan. 3, 1961, terminating diplo-
matic and consular relations. U.S. Breaks Ties with Government of Cuba, Maintains its
Treaty Rights in Guantanamo Base, 44 DEP'T ST. BULL. 103 (1961). Exchange of notes be-
tween United States and Cuba, May 30, 1977, establishing the interests sections. United
States and Cuba Agree to Open Interest Section, 77 DEP'T ST. BULL. 12 (1977).
170. 0. UHLER & H. CouRsiER, supra note 56, at 49.
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they do have access to those ministries. Therefore, it might be ar-
gued that they "find an audience" there. Pictet states that this
phrase means only that "the representations made by the diplo-
matic representative will be followed by results and that satisfac-
tory replies will be given to him. ' 171 During the Grenada invasion
the head of the U.S. Interests Section was in contact with the Cu-
ban foreign ministry, and messages were exchanged between
them. 172 The U.S. Interests Section did not, as noted above, re-
spond to the initial Cuban message of October 22, 1983 - perhaps
an indication that "satisfactory replies" were not given.
Pictet further specifies that "[it would also seem essential for
the representatives in question to have sufficient liberty of action
and liberty of movement to be able to visit their fellow-country-
men and come to their help when circumstances so require.' '1
73 It
is doubtful that this requirement was met in the relations between
the United States and Cuba in October, 1983. Immediately follow-
ing the invasion, the new provisional Government of Grenada re-
quired Cuban diplomats to leave Grenada. One Cuban diplomat
remained to facilitate the departure of Cuban nationals, but was
not permitted to visit the Cuban internees. 17 4 The United States
treated Cuba as a belligerent during the Grenada events. It did not
grant Cuban diplomatic representatives the liberty of action and
movement which was seen as a necessity for "normal diplomatic
representation."
Thus, the Cubans, if attacked by U.S. forces (and those who
by everyone's agreement did not attack U.S. forces) were "pro-
tected persons," under Geneva IV. As "protected persons," they
were entitled to the same protections that Geneva IV extends to
civilian internees.
XI. LEGALITY OF INTERNMENT
A civilian protected under Geneva IV may not be interned un-
171. Id.
172. Interview with John Ferch, Chief of the United States Interests Section in Ha-
vana, Cuba, in Havana (May 10, 1984).
173. 0. UHLER & H. COURSIER, supra note 56, at 49.
174. A State Department official was quoted, immediately following the invasion, as
saying, with regard to Cuban diplomats in Grenada, "We don't want them rattling around
the island." TIME, Nov. 14, 1983, at 22. U.S. forces vandalized the Cuban ambassador's resi-




less "the security of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely nec-
essary.'1 75 U.S. forces took into custody all the Cubans it found at
Point Salines.' 76 It is questionable whether such detention was
"absolutely necessary" to the security of the U.S. forces. The U.S.
forces detained approximately 630 Cubans at Point Salines; of
these, approximately 500 were construction workers. The remain-
der were clerical and other personnel connected with the construc-
tion operation. Many were teachers who provided high school
equivalency courses for the workers. There were about forty Cuban
military personnel in Grenada as advisors. A certain number of
these-it is not clear just how many-were at Point Salines and
were taken into custody. The construction workers were employees
of the National Union of Enterprises-Caribbean (UNECA in the
Spanish-language acronym), a Cuban state-owned firm that en-
gages in general construction work.1 77
Most of the approximately 630 Cubans did not engage in hos-
tilities against the U.S. troops. They remained in the dormitory
buildings during the hostilities, awaiting the outcome of the en-
counter. Approximately 200 Cubans were captured with weapons.
Those captured without weapons were considered civilian internees
by the U.S. forces, while those captured with weapons were consid-
ered combatants and interned as prisoners of war.1 s This categori-
zation was based on the proposition that the Cubans started the
shooting against the U.S. forces.17 9 Because that proposition is
highly unlikely, 80 the categorization is incorrect. If the Cubans did
not initiate combat, then they are civilians.
If, as the Cuban Government asserted, the Cubans with weap-
ons were prepared to defend themselves if attacked, then the U.S.
might argue that they were security risks, even if they did not ini-
tiate combat with the U.S. troops. This would be a difficult pro-
position to sustain, however, because one is not a combatant unless
one intends to participate in hostilities, and, according to the Cu-
ban Government's version, that was not the workers' intent.
175. Geneva IV, supra note 164, art. 42, para. 1.
176. Wash. Post, Oct. 28, 1983, at A7, col. 6. Le Monde, Nov. 1, 1983, at 3, col. 5.
177. Interview with workers of UNECA who returned from Grenada, at Puerto Escon-
dido, Cuba (May 11, 1984).
178. "A distinction was made between 'combatants' and those not 'combatants.' Those
captured with weapons in hand were considered combatants, which were about 200, or a
third, of the prisoners." Le Monde, Nov. 1, 1983, at 3, col. 5.
179. N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1983, at A7, col. 3.
180. Text following note 82, supra.
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XII. TREATMENT IN CONFINEMENT
The Cubans, once interned, were entitled either to the protec-
tions of Geneva IV, or, in case they were "combatants," the protec-
tion of Geneva III. Admiral Wesley McDonald indicated that the
U.S. Government considered itself bound by humanitarian law. He
stated to the press with regard to the interned Cubans: "We're
treating them exactly under the Geneva Convention. '" 181
The Cuban workers did not allege that the United States com-
mitted any physical brutality against them. They have, however,
alleged certain acts which would constitute violations of their
rights either as civilian internees or prisoners of war. A number of
Cubans stated that U.S. troops conducted mock executions, lining
them up against a wall and leading them to believe they were to be
shot.18 2 U.S. sources, however, have not commented on these alle-
gations. If these acts did occur, they would be in violation of hu-
manitarian law. Geneva III prohibits acts of intimidation against
prisoners of war,183 while Geneva IV prohibits threats of violence
against civilian internees. 8 '
The Cuban workers also complained of being exposed to the
sun for long periods of time, sitting on hot asphalt or in the
dust.185 Geneva IV obligates the detaining power to use "buildings
or quarters which. . .provide efficient protection against the rigors
of the climate."'8 6 Geneva III requires "premises. . .affording
every guarantee of hygiene and healthfulness. 187 These standards
181. McDonald did not indicate whether he meant Geneva III (prisoners of war) or
Geneva IV (civilian internees). N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1983, at A7, col. 1.
182. Granma Weekly Review, Nov. 13, 1983, at 7, col. 3 (statement of Alberto Diaz
Calder~n). Ayda Osorio, a secretary, said that she and several fellow prisoners were blind-
folded and made to stand against a wall while a squad of U.S. military personnel cocked
their rifles, causing the Cubans to believe that they would be executed. London Times, Nov.
5, 1983, at 6, col. 3. Sara Carcases Verdecia, a Spanish teacher who conducted classes for the
workers, said that this was done to a group that consisted of seven women and five men, of
which she was a part, shortly before their release. Id. at 5, col. 1. See EDITORIAL DE
CIENCIAS, supra note 1, at 214.
183. Geneva III, supra note 4, art. 13, para. 2.
184. Geneva IV, supra note 164, art. 27, para. 1.
185. London Times, Nov. 5, 1983, at 5, col. 1. Evaristo Garcia, a 50-year-old construc-
tion foreman, stated that he did not have a weapon but was wounded by two bullets, includ-
ing one in a lung. He further stated that he was denied medical attention the first 24 hours
of his captivity and had to lie in the sun on his stomach, hands behind his head, under
guard. Garcia said he fled when the fighting started but was shot when he returned to rescue
a wounded friend. London Times, Nov. 5, 1983, at 6, col. 1, R 17.
186. Geneva IV, supra note 164, art. 85, para. 1.
187. Geneva III, supra note 4, art. 22, para. 1.
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were apparently not met, at least in the initial period of confine-
ment. A Pentagon film made October 27 showed "the [Cuban]
prisoners. . .lying close together on the pavements, many of them
covering themselves with large straw hats from what was appar-
ently hot sun." '188 Admiral McDonald wrote that completion of a
camp for the detainees "took several days due to the lack of read-
ily available equipment, causing a delay in moving the Detainees to
an acceptable facility. '1 89
A number of the workers stated they were not permitted ac-
cess to toilet facilities.'90 Geneva IV requires that "internees shall
have for their use, day and night, sanitary conveniences which con-
form to the rules of hygiene,"' 9 ' while Geneva III states that "pris-
oners of war shall have for their use, day and night, conveniences
which conform to the rules of hygiene."'' 9
Women internees said that male soldiers carried out a "shame-
ful search" of their persons, putting their hands inside the
women's clothing.'9 3 Geneva IV states that "a woman internee
shall not be searched except by a woman."'9 4 Geneva III states:
"Women shall be treated with all the regard due to their sex.' 95
U.S. forces apparently interrogated the Cuban workers,' 91 and
according to some of the workers, U.S. Spanish-speaking interro-
gators encouraged them to defect to the United States.'9 7 But
there were no allegations of physical or psychological coercion to
get information from internees. Therefore the interrogations con-
ducted did not violate the humanitarian conventions.' 98
188. Wash. Post, Oct. 28, 1983, at A7, cols. 1-2.
189. Report by Adm. Wesley McDonald, supra note 32, at 111-9. The Cuban construc-
tion workers were kept outdoors for six days, at which time a tent city was erected for them.
T mE, Nov. 14, 1983, at 23.
190. London Times, Nov. 5, 1983, at 5, col. 1. Interview with various Cuban workers
who had returned from Grenada, at Puerto Escondido, Cuba (May 11, 1984).
191. Geneva IV, supra note 164, art. 85, para. 3.
192. Geneva III, supra note 4, art. 29, para. 2.
193. London Times, Nov. 5, 1983, at 5, col. 1.
194. Geneva IV, supra note 164, art. 97, para. 4.
195. Geneva III, supra note 4, art. 14, para. 2.
196. Adm. Wesley McDonald stated: "We're trying to get information, as much as we
can." N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1983, at A7, col. 1.
197. London Times, Nov. 5, 1983, at 5, col. 1; TIME, Nov. 14, 1983, at 23.
198. Neither Geneva III nor Geneva IV prohibits interrogation, but both prohibit coer-
cion. "No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion may be inflicted on
prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war
who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant or
disadvantageous treatment of any kind." Geneva III, supra note 4, art. 17, para. 4. "No
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XIII. PROPERTY OF CUBAN WORKERS AND OF THE CUBAN
GOVERNMENT
Cuban workers also stated that property belonging to them
personally, as well as property of their construction company, was
taken and retained by U.S. forces. Workers claimed that personal
items such as cameras, watches, radios, tape recorders, fans, hair
dryers, and articles of clothing were removed from them and never
returned. 9 9 Some confirmation of these charges is provided by the
fact that the workers who arrived at Havana Airport carried no
luggage.20 0 The humanitarian conventions prohibit the taking of
personal effects from prisoners or internees and require any items
taken to be returned upon release.201
Workers also said that large bulldozers and other construction
equipment of the Cuban construction firm, mostly manufactured
in Japan, were taken by U.S. forces.20 2 According to a U.S. journal-
ist, U.S. forces at Point Salines "commandeered Cuban cars,
trucks, tractors and even a navy blue Mercedes-Benz sedan with
ambassador's flagstaffs on either fender. ' 20 3 These vehicles appar-
ently have not been returned to the Cuban Government or to its
state-owned company, the National Union of Enterprises
-Caribbean.
According to the so-called right of angary, a belligerent is enti-
tled to appropriate property of a neutral state located in belliger-
ent territory.0 4 Property may be seized if it is urgently needed for
physical or moral coercion shall be exercised against protected persons, in particular to ob-
tain information from them." Geneva IV, supra note 164, art. 31. One internee reported that
conditions improved after representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross
arrived to arrange repatriation: "They didn't try to provoke us so much." EDITORIAL Da
CIENCIAS, supra note 1, at 214. Cubans received medical treatment from U.S. personnel as-
sisted by medical students at the St. George's Medical School True Blue Campus. N.Y.
Times, Oct. 27, 1983, at A20, col. 6.
199. Carcaces stated: "The living quarters were sacked, our suitcases emptied and
many of our belongings stolen." She reported seeing her Zenith camera on the cartridge belt
of a U.S. officer. London Times, Nov. 5, 1983, at 5, col. 1. Interview with Cuban workers who
had returned from Grenada, at Puerto Escondido, Cuba (May 11, 1984).
200. N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1983, at A20, col. 1.
201. Geneva III, supra note 4, art. 18, para. 1. Geneva IV, supra note 164, art. 97,
paras. 1 and 5.
202. Interview with Cuban workers who had returned from Grenada, at Puerto Escon-
dido, Cuba (May 11, 1984). EDITORIAL DE CIENCIAS, supra note 1, at 225.
203. Wash. Post, Oct. 28, 1983, at A16, col. 6.
204. M. GREENSPAN, supra note 158, at 581.
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military purposes or to prevent its use by the enemy. 206 It is not
clear why U.S. troops appropriated the Cuban vehicles. They ap-
parently wanted to move the vehicles off the airstrip in order to
use it for incoming aircraft. The right to take neutral-state vehicles
extends only to military need. Thus the vehicles should have been
returned as soon as hostilities ceased.
XIV. CONCLUSION
The United States-Cuban military encounter on Grenada
presents difficult issues, both factual and legal, with respect to the
use of force. If the Cuban workers were part of the defense of Gre-
nada and endeavored, upon instruction from the Cuban Govern-
ment, to prevent entry into Grenada by U.S. forces, then responsi-
bility for use of force turns on the legality of the U.S. military
action. If the United States was justified in its use of force in Gre-
nada, then the Cuban Government would not be justified in using
force to oppose it. The Cuban Government would be responsible to
the United States under the law of state responsibility. If, on the
other hand, the United States was not justified-and this seems
the more tenable position-then the Cuban Government would
have been justified in using force, provided the Grenadian Govern-
ment had requested them to do so, pursuant to article 51 of the
United Nations Charter (collective self-defense provision).
With respect to the status of internees issue, the result again
varies depending on the version of events one believes. The U.S.
version is that the Cuban workers constituted a group of non-na-
tional civilians who resisted by force of arms the entry of an invad-
ing force. If true, then the U.S. forces were entitled to execute the
Cubans as criminals. This result, while allowed by Geneva III,
seems harsh and indicates a need for revision of the levee en masse
provision of Geneva III.
Under the facts as portrayed by the Cuban Government, the
situation is quite unique: a group of non-national civilians
presented no resistance to the entry of an invading force but were
unwilling to surrender, and therefore prepared to defend them-
selves by force of arms. If true, then the Cubans were entitled to
be considered as civilian internees rather than as prisoners of war.
Under either version of the facts, the U.S. forces violated the
205. Id. at 581-82.
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humanitarian law by retaining property of the Cuban workers and
of the state-owned Cuban construction company and may have
also violated the humanitarian law in several respects relating to
the treatment of internees.
